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ABSTRACT
Liberal democracies aspire to respect minimum standards of individual
liberty and due process to all. They structurally limit their powers with respect
to how they treat all persons—including noncitizens, also known as “aliens.”
Nonetheless, the exact scope and nature of the limitations imposed by
international and domestic legal regimes for the expulsion of noncitizens still
remains uncertain and is in a constant state of evolution in multiple directions.
Indeed, a mix of situational progression and regression characterizes these
regimes. The proper balance between personal liberty, due process, and equal
protection on the one hand—and security, economic and related governmental
and other common societal interests on the other, has proven elusive. This
Article attempts to identify the minimum international standards that apply to
the expulsion of aliens in times of war and peace, and measure these
international standards against those that apply in the United States and
European Union. By so doing, it intends to highlight the congruity and
disjuncture between the international standards and the standards that apply
in the United States and European Union, and extricate the best practices that
they could learn from each other.
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INTRODUCTION
Under international law and many domestic jurisdictions, the term “alien”1
is commonly used to refer to a person who is not a citizen or a national of the
country of his residence.2 The alien-citizen dichotomy is as old as the
emergence of the nation-state itself3 and always operates to legitimize
exclusion, and, at times, subordination.4 The jurisprudential importance of this
distinction is enduring. In the United States, some aliens are not considered
part of “We the People” for purposes of certain constitutional rights.5

1 See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)
[hereinafter INA] (“The term ‘alien’ means any person not a citizen or national of the United States.”).
2 There are other examples of the common usage of “alien” in international sources. See Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 35, 38, 41, 45, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force August 12, 1949) [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]
(setting forth minimum standards of treatment for “aliens in the territory of a party to the conflict”); see also
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 13, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, S. Treaty
Doc. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (setting forth minimum standards of treatment of aliens in
times of peace). See generally Special Rapporteur on the Expulsion of Aliens, Sixth Rep. on Expulsion of
Aliens, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/625/Add.1 (May 28, 2010) (by Maurice Kamto) [hereinafter
Sixth Report on the Expulsion of Aliens] (assessing the state of international law on the expulsion of aliens,
mainly in peace time).
3 According to the United States Supreme Court, “Citizenship as a head of jurisdiction and a ground of
protection was old when Paul invoked it in his appeal to Caesar.” Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769
(1950).
4 Professor Tayyab Mahmud notes, “The sovereignty impulse locates citizens within firm territorial
boundaries, constitutes individual and collective identities, privileges a homogenous subjectivity eligible for
political recognition, and posits identities of ineligible others.” Tayyab Mahmud, Migration, Identity, & the
Colonial Encounter, 76 OR. L. REV. 633, 636–37 (1997).
5 The jurisprudence in this area is complicated but consider the following passage from Justice
Brennan’s dissenting opinion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez:

According to the majority, the term “the people” refers to “a class of persons who are part of a
national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to
be considered part of that community.” The Court admits that “the people” extends beyond the
citizenry, but leaves the precise contours of its “sufficient connection” test unclear. At one point
the majority hints that aliens are protected by the Fourth Amendment only when they come
within the United States and develop “substantial connections” with our country. At other
junctures, the Court suggests that an alien’s presence in the United States must be voluntary and
that the alien must have “accepted some societal obligations.” At yet other points, the majority
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Similarly, in the European Union,6 “third-country nationals”7 possess rights
inferior not only to citizens of the country they find themselves in but also to
persons from other E.U. Member States.8

implies that respondent would be protected by the Fourth Amendment if the place searched were
in the United States.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 282–83 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265, 271, 273).
In the United States, a century-old jurisprudence effectively establishes a hierarchy of aliens, but the
rights-based alien-citizen/national distinction is evident. For a discussion of the hierarchy, see VICTOR C.
ROMERO, ALIENATED: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA 82–84 (2005);
Won Kidane, The Alienage Spectrum Disorder: The Bill of Rights from Chinese Exclusion to Guantanamo, 20
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 89, 148–49 (2010); and David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional
Protection for Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 96–97 (2001).
6 The European Union has been in a constant and rapid state of transformation over the last several
decades. A complex web of treaties, regulations, and directives define its nature, structure, competences, and
functioning. The legal instruments which are currently most important are: Consolidated Version of the Treaty
on the European Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C83) 13 [hereinafter TEU]; Consolidated Version of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]; and
Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 27 O.J. (C 306) 1 (entered into force Dec. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].
A comprehensive set of information about all aspects of the European Union’s existence, including the texts of
all of the treaties, is available on the official website. EUROPA, http://europa.eu/index_en.htm (last visited
Feb. 5, 2013). The most notable regularly updated treatise on this subject is P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO
EUROPEAN UNION LAW AS AMENDED BY THE TREATY OF LISBON (10th ed. 2010) (providing a comprehensive
review of current E.U. law).
7 The free movement of persons is one of the fundamental principles of the European Union. Persons
who are not nationals of an E.U. Member State are called “third-country nationals.” See TFEU art. 79. They do
not enjoy the full freedom of movement and are subject to certain sets of regulations. See id. The Treaty of
Lisbon has modified the legal basis for the Union’s law-making in the areas of immigration and asylum. EU
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW: COMMENTARY ON EU REGULATIONS AND DIRECTIVES 1–9 (Kay
Hailbronner ed., 2010) [hereinafter E.U. IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW]. This may have some significance
in the future, but some basic common rules and regulations are already in effect. The most relevant provisions
of the TFEU that apply to third-country nationals are articles 67–89. TFEU arts. 67–89. Entry, residency, and
expulsion are also governed by a set of subsidiary sources of regulations and directives. Some notable ones
include Council Regulation 539/2001, Annex 1, 2001 O.J. (L 81) 1, 5–6 (EC) (listing the countries whose
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are
exempt from that requirement); Council Regulation 562/2006, art. 1, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 1, 3 (EC) (establishing
Community Code (Schengen Borders Code) on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders);
and Council Directive 2004/83, art. 1, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12, 14 (EC) [hereinafter E.U. Directive on Minimum
Standards for Qualification] (creating minimum standards for the qualification and status of third-country
nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the
content of the protection granted). Finally, the standards that are most relevant for purposes of the movement
of third-country nationals are contained in Directive 2008/115, art. 1, 2008 O.J. (L 348) 98, 100 [hereinafter
E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return]. The texts of all of these and other related E.U. regulations
and directives on the movement on third-country nationals are available on the E.U. official website.
EUROPA, supra note 6. For a detailed commentary, see E.U. IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW, supra, at 1–9.
8 Under the TFEU, the nationals of Member States of the Union are considered citizens of the Union
with a wide range of some fundamental rights including non-discrimination, freedom of movement and

KIDANE GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

7/16/2013 10:28 AM

EXPULSION OF ALIENS

289

In modern times, the old justification for disparate treatment of foreign
nationals9 has been replaced by the more credible notion of national
sovereignty.10 Contemporary notions of sovereignty and political independence
now provide the political and jurisprudential justification11 for the exclusion,12

residence, and political representation. See TFEU arts. 19–25. For a comprehensive discussion of the free
movement of E.U. citizens and nationals of third countries, see MATHIJSEN, supra note 6, at 238–364.
9 Tayyab Mahmud explains:
Liberalism and colonialism developed alongside each other. With rare exceptions, liberals
approved of colonialism and provided it with a legitimizing ideology. If eligibility for universal
rights was conditioned upon recognized subjectivity, claims to these rights could be denied if the
subjectivity of some was erased. By resting such an erasure on pre-social, biological grounds, one
could say with confidence that ‘higher races are inherently more qualified for both political and
individual liberty than the lower.’ Liberal discourses of rights, inclusion, and equality could be
reconciled with colonial policies of exclusion and discrimination by positing essential differences
between different types of individuals and subjectivities.
Tayyab Mahmud, Colonialism and Modern Constructions of Race: A Preliminary Inquiry, 53 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1219, 1222 (1999) (footnote omitted) (quoting Robert Knox, Race Legislation and Political Economy, 13
ANTHROPOLOGICAL REV.113, 126 (1866)).
10 The most fundamental principle that underpins the post-World War II world order is the principle of
sovereign equality and non-interference. It gained its most authoritative expression in the Charter of the United
Nations. This principle now serves as the foundation of contemporary international law and world order. See
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1 (“The Organization is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its
Members.”). For a discussion of the role of sovereignty in shaping the jurisprudence involving aliens in the
United States, see Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 862–63 (1987). Henkin discredits the use of sovereignty as
an excuse to deny due process and equal protection to aliens, and arguing that it is incompatible with modern
notions of due process and equal protection. Id. at 863. Indeed, Henkin is reported to have advocated the
banishment of the term sovereignty from the legal lexicon because it is so loose a concept. See Lori Fisler
Damrosch, In Memoriam, Louis Henkin (1917–2010), 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 287, 300 (2011).
11 See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889)
(holding that sovereign states have unrestricted power to exclude aliens). Although the Chinese Exclusion
Case was decided more than a century ago, it still provides the justification for the distinct treatment of aliens
on the basis of the sovereign’s unlimited right to exclude and regulate the conditions of aliens. See Henkin,
supra note 10, at 862–63. For related commentary discussing alternative ways that the Court has taken in
mitigating the harshest consequences of the Chinese Exclusion Case jurisprudence, see Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990).
12 Exclusion generally refers to the denial of entry or admission. In both the United States and European
Union, those who are seeking to gain entry and those who have already entered and are present in the territory
are subject to different standards of treatment including in the procedures of return or removal. These concepts
are often accompanied by legal fictions that consider persons who are already inside the territory for certain
periods of time as seeking admission or entry. See INA §§ 235–36, 239–40, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225–26, 1229–30
(2006); E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 2(2)(a), at 101 (“Member States
may decide not to apply this Directive to third-country nationals who: (a) are subject to refusal of entry . . . .”).
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inferior treatment,13 and expulsion14 of aliens.15 These are fundamental
concepts and are elaborated in various sections below.
Notwithstanding such justifications, in contemporary liberal societies,
maturing notions of human rights and civil liberties constrain the crude
exercise of sovereign power.16 At the most general level, liberal democracies
13 Aliens generally are not eligible to participate in the political process. Their economic rights are also
limited. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80, 83 (1976) (upholding the federal government’s power to
make a distinction between lawful resident aliens and citizens for purposes of public benefits on the basis of
the length of their stay).
14 In international law and many domestic jurisdictions, various terminologies are employed to designate
the process leading up to and the actual physical removal of the alien. These terminologies include expulsion,
removal, deportation, return, et cetera. The Secretariat of the United Nations, in a memorandum on the
expulsion of aliens submitted to the International Law Commission (the “ILC”) in 2006 made a clear
distinction between expulsion, which refers to the process leading up to the final order of removal, and
deportation, which signifies the actual physical removal of the alien. See U.N. Secretariat, Expulsion of Aliens:
Memorandum by the Secretariat, para. 91, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/565 (July 10, 2006)
[hereinafter ILC Expulsion Memorandum]. However, many domestic jurisdictions do not adhere to these
designations. For example, in the United States, the proceedings are called “removal proceedings” and the
actual deportation is called “removal.” See INA §§ 239–41. In the European Union, the preferred term is
“return,” which refers to both the process and the actual deportation. See, e.g., E.U. Directive on Common
Standards of Return, supra note 7. The term “expulsion” is used in this Article to signify both the process and
the actual deportation or removal. No particular effort is made to adhere strictly to terminology and some of
these terms are sometimes used interchangeably. Their meaning should be clear from the context.
15 States are generally entitled to remove aliens from their territories. Certain restrictions apply. The
nature and scope of these restrictions are the central focus of this Article and elaborated in various sections in
detail.
16 In the wake of the Second World War, the community of nations recognized that “the inherent dignity
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world” and that the “disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind” and promised each other to respect the
fundamental rights of all individuals without regard to “race, color, sex, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217 (III) A, pmbl., art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; see also ICCPR,
supra note 2, art. 2 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status.”). These basic principles are now presumably the bedrock of the
Bill of Rights of the constitutions of most members of the United Nations, which are bound by these principles
as a matter of international law. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”); see also Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art.
21(1)–(2), Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 389, 396 (“Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex,
language, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any
other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age, or sexual orientation shall be
prohibited . . . .Within the scope of application of the Treaties establishing [the European Community and of
the Treaty on European Union] and without prejudice to the special provisions of those Treaties, any
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.”). The Charter is incorporated into the Treaty of
Lisbon by reference. Treaty of Lisbon art. 6(1).
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subscribe to certain minimum standards, which structurally limit their powers
in how they treat all persons—including aliens.17 Nonetheless, the exact scope
and nature of the limitations imposed by international and domestic legal
standards still remain uncertain and are in a constant state of evolution in
multiple directions. Indeed, they are characterized by a mix of situational
progression and regression.18 The proper balance between personal liberty, due
process, and equal protection on the one hand—and security, economic and
related governmental and other common societal interests on the other—has
always proven elusive.19 However, the ambitions of this Article are limited to
identifying the minimum international standards that apply to the expulsion of
aliens in times of war and peace,20 and to measuring these standards against
those that apply in the United States and the European Union. By so doing, this
Article intends to highlight the congruity and disjuncture between the
international standards and the standards that apply in the United States and
European Union, and to extricate the best practices that one could learn from
the other.

17 Several good recent example of this are the U.S. Supreme Court’s checks on the Bush administration’s
measures against “war on terror” detainees at Guantanamo Bay. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 792
(2008) (holding that certain procedures contained in some Congressional Acts unconstitutionally suspended
habeas corpus by failing to provide an adequate substitute for habeas corpus); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557, 631–32 (2006) (holding that trial by a military commission violated the Geneva Conventions, in
particular, Common Article 3, which requires trial by “a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized people” (quoting Geneva Convention IV, supra
note 2, art. 3(1)(d))); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447 (2004) (limiting habeas jurisdiction to the district
of confinement); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (holding that enemy aliens detained in Guantanamo
Bay have a statutory right to contest the legality of their detention by habeas corpus); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (holding that a U.S. citizen held as an enemy combatant must be given a reasonable
opportunity to contest his designation before a neutral decision-maker).
18 See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR
ON TERRORISM 85 (2003) (“The pattern of selectively sacrificing noncitizen’s fundamental rights reflected the
government’s response to the attacks of September 11 has a lengthy pedigree in American history . . . .
Ultimately, when a sufficient number of citizens are affected, the political and legal processes react, and only
then are the measures seen as mistakes.”).
19 See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 956 (2002) (“When a democratic society strikes
that balance in ways that impose the costs and benefits uniformly on all, one might be relatively confident that
the political processes will ultimately achieve a proper balance. Since September 11, we have repeatedly done
precisely the opposite.”).
20 It does so notwithstanding the criticism that international standards are often disregarded in the
domestic arena because the reality is that contemporary societies seem to pay close attention not only to
international standards but also to what their peers are doing, hence the importance of comparative studies. For
an example of the classic expression of the disregard of international standards, see Joan Fitzpatrick & William
McKay Bennett, A Lion in the Path? The Influence of International Law on the Immigration Policy of the
United States, 70 WASH. L. REV. 589 (1995).
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The Article is divided into two main parts. Part I surveys the various
sources of international law that define the scope of a state’s right to expel
aliens and the limitations thereof, both in times of war and peace. Because
wartime rules are mainly international, that part of the discussion will not have
a direct comparative component. It is included to provide perspective on the
limitations of state power to expel aliens even in times of war as a benchmark
for the rules that apply in times of peace.21 The discussion of the international
standards that apply in peacetime in Part I will be followed by a comparative
analysis of the U.S. and E.U. rules on the expulsion of aliens in Part II. In
particular, Part II measures the respective peacetime rules against the
international standards and identifies peculiar advantages and disadvantages of
each one of the two systems. It also highlights the lessons that the two systems
could learn from one another so as to better the treatment of foreign nationals
in their own respective societies.
I. THE EXPULSION OF ALIENS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
States regularly assert their right to expel aliens.22 However, “[i]rrespective
of the existence or non-existence of an unlimited right to expel foreigners,
their-ill treatment, abrupt expulsion, or expulsion in an offensive manner is a
breach of the minimum standards of international law with which their home
States may expect compliance.”23 There is no disagreement in the literature

21 I OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 941 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watt eds., 9th ed. 1996)
(“Theory and practice correctly make a distinction between expulsion in time of hostilities and in time of
peace. A belligerent may consider it convenient to expel all hostile nationals residing, or temporarily staying,
within its territory: although such a measure may be very hard on individual aliens, it is generally accepted that
such expulsion is justifiable.”).
22 Perhaps the most classic expression of the sovereign right to expel is the U.S. Supreme Court’s
statement in what is commonly called the Chinese Exclusion Case:

The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the
government of the United States . . . the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of
the government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on
behalf of anyone.
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
23 ILC Expulsion Memorandum, supra note 14, at 172 n.504 (quoting Georg Schwarzenberger, The
Fundamental Principles of International Law, in 87 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADÉMIE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 290, 309–10 (1955)). This quote presents it in the context of the alien’s state’s right to
complain, which is a useful perspective in international law. See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIAL 596 (5th ed. 2009) (“Long ago, we know, a government which
offended a citizen of Rome offended Rome.”); see also Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.) 1955 I.C.J. 4, 24 (Apr. 6)
(“[B]y taking up the case of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial
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that certain basic, minimum standards constrain a state’s rights to expel aliens
from its territory.24 The restrictions are more pronounced in the area of
procedural due process.25 However, as United Nations Special Rapporteur on
the Expulsion of Aliens, Maurice Kamto, noted, “Strictly speaking, there are
no detailed rules in international law establishing expulsion proceedings and
reconciling the rights of the individual subject to expulsion with the sovereign
rights of the expelling State.”26 There are, however, several scattered rules of
international law that set some minimum standards of treatment of aliens in a
variety of contexts. The following Subpart discusses such rules, dividing them
into wartime rules and peacetime rules.
A. The Expulsion of Aliens in Times of War in International Law
Although this Article focuses on procedural due process as applied in times
of peace, it is important to highlight the idea that under international law, even
in times of war, the sovereign’s power to expel aliens is limited.27 It must
accord them procedural due process whenever it may justifiably expel them.28
Indeed, nations must keep in mind that although special rules of international
humanitarian law29 apply in times of armed conflict, application of those rules
proceedings on his behalf, a state is in reality asserting its own rights—its right to ensure, in the person of its
subject, respect for the rules of international law.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24 “In principle, the alien is entitled to treatment no less favorable than the ‘minimum standard’ required
by international law. His expulsion arbitrarily or without good cause may well amount to treatment below that
minimum standard.” ILC Expulsion Memorandum, supra note 14, at 172 n.505 (quoting RICHARD PLENDER,
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 460 (2d ed. 1988)).
25 Sixth Report on the Expulsion of Aliens, supra note 2, para. 48, at 19.
26 See id., para. 1, at 3.
27 ILC Expulsion Memorandum, supra note 14, para. 105, at 39.
28 Id.
29 The term “international humanitarian law,” also known as “jus in bello,” represents in its current usage
all rules of international law designed to govern the treatment of human persons, civilian, or military, active,
inactive, sick, or wounded in armed conflict. Won Kidane, Civil Liability for Violations of International
Humanitarian Law: The Jurisprudence of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission in the Hague, 25 WIS.
INT’L L.J. 1, 1 (2007). It is “a cohesive body of law, but a category of separate legal proscriptions.” See M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA 441 (1996) (citing Hans-Peter Gasser, International Humanitarian Law, in HANS HAUG,
HUMANITY FOR ALL 1, 3 (1993)). Most rules of current importance are contained in the Four Geneva
Conventions of 1949. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 33 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relevant to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 4. The two
Additional Protocols of 1977 provide additional rules: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
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is also limited.30 According to the International Court of Justice, “[T]he
protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of
armed conflict save through the effect of provisions for derogation . . . .”31
Although exigencies of war often justify measures that would not be allowed
in peacetime, international humanitarian law impose certain limits on the
behavior of belligerents towards civilian populations, including aliens present
in their respective territories. The primary sources of law for the treatment of
aliens in the territory of a belligerent are the Geneva Convention IV and
Additional Protocol I,32 both of which are examined below.
Over the ages, the law pertaining to the treatment of enemy aliens has
evolved “from enslavement to the securing of human rights through modern
international humanitarian law.”33 At the most basic level under contemporary
international humanitarian law, aliens within the territory of the adverse party
to the conflict, often called “enemy aliens,”34 enjoy the general protection of
receiving humane treatment just like any civilian person35 who falls into the
hands of a belligerent.36

U.N.T.S. 4 [hereinafter Protocol I]; and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 100-2, 1125 U.N.T.S. 610 [hereinafter Protocol II]. This also comprises a set of rules formerly known as
the Laws of War contained in the Hague Conventions of 1907. The Hague Conventions are reprinted in
DOCUMENTS IN THE LAWS OF WAR 67–137 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000). More recent
instruments include the U.N. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10,
1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 163. This set of rules is distinct from a body of rules governing the legitimacy of the
resort to force, often referred to as the jus ad bellum, which is essentially based on Article 2 and Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. See generally FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH
ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW (1987).
30 See KALSHOVEN & ZEGVELD, supra note 29, at 83–84.
31 Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, para. 106 (July 9).
32 Some subsidiary sources are discussed in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED
CONFLICTS 280 n.57 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995) [hereinafter HUMANITARIAN LAW HANDBOOK].
33 Id. at 279–80.
34 The concept of “enemy aliens” has many dimensions and has in recent times attracted significant
attention in scholarly literature. For a good review of the various aspects of the concept under international law
and U.S. domestic history and jurisprudence linked to the “war on terror,” see generally Cole, supra note 19.
For an elaborate version, see COLE, supra note 18.
35 Under international humanitarian law, these civilian persons are called “protected persons.” Protected
persons include “those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a
conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not
nationals.” Geneva Convention IV, supra note 26, art. 4.
36 See id. arts. 13–26.
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Save for justifiable national security reasons, belligerent nations generally
respect the freedom of movement of enemy aliens. For example, under Article
35 of Geneva Convention IV, “All protected persons [including aliens] who
may desire to leave the territory at the outset of, or during a conflict, shall be
entitled to do so, unless their departure is contrary to the national interests of
the State.”37 More importantly, the same provision guarantees procedural due
process. It provides that “[t]he applications of such persons to leave shall be
decided in accordance with regularly established procedures and the decision
shall be taken as rapidly as possible.”38 Moreover, “[i]f any such person is
refused permission to leave the territory, he shall be entitled to have such
refusal reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or
administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose.”39
This provision is fundamentally about respecting the wishes of protected
persons, especially their right to movement, but its emphasis is obviously on
departure, which is often the most serious challenge for enemy aliens trapped
in an enemy state. However, as the official commentary of the International
Committee of the Red Cross notes, “The words ‘who may desire to leave the
territory’ show quite clearly that the departure of the protected persons
concerned will take place only if they wish to leave.”40 It further notes, in fact,
that “[t]he International Committee’s original draft laid down that no protected
person could be repatriated against his will” and concludes that “the same idea
is implicit in the text actually adopted.”41 This means the forcible repatriation
of aliens to their countries of origin is prohibited.42 Geneva Convention IV also
prohibits the transfer of aliens to an occupying power’s own territory,43 to third
37

Id. art. 35; see also supra note 35 (defining “protected persons”).
Id.
39 Id.
40 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary: IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War 235 (1958).
41 Id.
42 Note, however, that the commentary further states that, “While forced repatriation—that is, sending a
person back to his country against his will—is prohibited, the right of expulsion has been retained. For
example, if France were to break off diplomatic relations with Germany, she would not be entitled to send
German nationals under escort to the German frontier against their will; she could, however, decree their
deportation and send them under escort to the Belgian, Spanish, or Swiss frontiers.” Id. at 235 n.1.
43 The transfer of populations to the territories of the occupying power is called deportation and is
considered a grave breach, and as such it is strictly prohibited unless it is justified for security reasons. See
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 2, arts. 45, 49, 147. See also Protocol I, supra note 29, art. 85
(characterizing the deportation of civilians to the territories of the occupying power as a grave breach of
international humanitarian law). The same principle is also enshrined in the statutes of the various international
criminal tribunals. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
38
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countries not bound by the Convention,44 as well as to any country where the
aliens may face persecution.45
Undeniably, there is some uncertainty in international humanitarian law
regarding the exact scope of the prohibition on the expulsion of aliens in times
of war. The classic International Humanitarian Law Handbook asks: “If aliens,
at the outbreak of a conflict, find themselves in the territory of a party to that
conflict, is it permissible for the authorities simply to put them on an aircraft or
to set them down at the border of the neighboring state against their will?”46
No express language in the texts of the Geneva Conventions or Protocols
answers this question. However, the answer is not as difficult as it may appear.
Article 38 of Geneva Convention IV provides that, except for some restrictions
that are justified because of wartime exigencies,47 “the situation of protected
persons shall continue to be regulated, in principle, by provisions concerning
aliens in time of peace.”48 Predicated on this and in answering the question it
raised about expulsion of aliens, the Handbook describes:
Certainly persons may not be deported to a country where they can
expect to be persecuted because of their political opinions and
religious convictions . . . . In this connection attention is drawn to
Article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which stipulates an orderly procedure for expulsion of aliens and in
particular enabling the persons concerned to present their own
49
case.”

Despite the uncertainty of the exact scope of the substantive prohibition, one
rule is consistently clear: The belligerent must accord aliens procedural due
process. The standards for such process ordinarily come from human rights
law applied in peacetime, which is discussed below.

44 See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 2, art. 45 (“Protected persons shall not be transferred to a
Power which is not a party to the Convention. This provision shall in no way constitute an obstacle to the
repatriation of protected persons, or their return to their country of residence after the cessation of hostilities.”).
45 This is a classic statement of the principle of non-refoulement, although the grounds appear to be
limited to political opinion and religious belief. See id.
46 HUMANITARIAN LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at 287.
47 See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 2, arts. 27, 41 (allowing certain necessary measures of control
in the interest of security).
48 See id. art. 38.
49 See HUMANITARIAN LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 32 at 287.
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B. The Expulsion of Aliens in Times of Peace in International Law
The principal branch of international law that applies to the expulsion of
aliens in peacetime is international human rights law.50 Numerous recognized
human rights are relevant to the expulsion of aliens, as the measures affect not
only the person who is subject to the expulsion process, but also his or her
family members.51 As such, some of the substantive rights might include the
rights of the family and children.52 Because the focus of this Article is
procedural due process, the related substantive rights53 are not discussed.
As far as procedural due process is concerned, the most important
multilateral treaties that set minimum standards are: The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”);54 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”);55 Convention Relating to the
Status of Stateless Persons (“Stateless Persons Convention”);56 Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel and Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (“CAT”);57 and the International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and members of Their Families (“Migrant
Workers Rights Convention”).58 Relevant regional instruments include the

50 In principle, “the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms provided for in international
instruments should also be ensured for individuals who are not nationals of the country in which they live.”
General Assembly Declaration on Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the Country in
Which They Live, G.A. Res. 40/144, Annex, para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES 40/144 (Dec. 13, 1985). This Article
does not go into the details of the problems associated with the enforcement of international human rights law.
The standards are discussed here to show what is expected of signatory states. For a good discussion of the
role of international human rights law in the area of immigration and associated real and perceived problems of
enforcement, see generally Lesley Wexler, The Non-Legal Role of International Human Rights Law in
Addressing Immigration, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 359 (2007).
51 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 40/144, supra note 50, art. 5.
52 See ILC Expulsion Memorandum, supra note 14, paras. 253–54.
53 See id. paras. 253–57 (discussing the state of international law in the area of substantive rights afforded
to aliens).
54 ICCPR, supra note 2.
55 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee
Convention]; see also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (lifting the
temporal and geographic limitations of the Refugee Convention of 1951).
56 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 [hereinafter
Stateless Persons Convention].
57 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (incorporated into U.S. law by the Foreign
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006)) [hereinafter CAT].
58 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2003) [hereinafter Migrant Workers
Rights Convention].
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American Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR”),59 and the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom
(“ECHR”).60
Collectively, these instruments set certain minimum standards on the
treatment of aliens and call for fair procedures for expulsion when such can be
lawfully carried out. The ICCPR contains two relevant provisions pertaining to
the rights of aliens, one of which directly addresses expulsion: Article 12 and
Article 13. Article 12 guarantees the rights of aliens to free movement within
the state where they are lawfully resident.61 As far as expulsion is concerned,
Article 13 of the ICCPR states:
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present
Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision
reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling
reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit
the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by,
and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or
a person or persons especially designated by the competent
62
authority.

While leaving the determination of the lawfulness of the alien’s presence to the
discretions of the State Party,63 this provision sets several minimum standards
in the expulsion process. Significantly, it requires procedural due process,
including a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to have recourse for
review.64 Most importantly, it also requires the provision of representation
during the expulsion process.65

59 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR] The United States signed the ACHR, but never ratified it. Multilateral
Treaties: American Convention on Human Rights, ORG. OF AM. STATES, http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
60 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 as amended by subsequent protocols) [hereinafter ECHR]. The Council of Europe
is designated only with international cooperation in mind, and it does not transfer or merge the sovereign rights
of its Member States. KLAUS-DIETER BORCHARDT, THE ABC OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 10–11 (2010).
61 ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 12.
62 Id. art. 13.
63 Article 13 also suggests that less favorable procedures might apply to aliens unlawfully within the
territory of the state and recognizes the reality that states sometimes apply inferior sets of procedures to aliens
unlawfully within their territory.
64 ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 13.
65 Id.
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The rules of the Refugee Convention are specific to persons who face
persecution, but they are still instructive. The Refugee Convention contains the
classic expression of the substantive principle of non-refoulement (nonreturn).66 It also contains a provision guaranteeing procedural due process.67 It
reads in relevant part:
1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their
territory save on grounds of national security or public order.
2. The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a
decision reached in accordance with due process of law. Except
where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the
refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to
appeal to and be represented for the purpose before competent
authority or a person or persons specially designated by the
68
competent authority.

The minimum standards of due process are stated in almost identical terms in
the Refugee Convention and in the ICCPR. The ICCPR suggests that
procedural due process is not limited to refugee status determination, but that it
is a general guarantee in all situations where a set of rules needs to be applied
to a set of disputed facts. To reiterate, the procedural guarantees are: the right
to be heard and present evidence, appellate review and, most importantly, the
right to be represented.
The Stateless Persons Convention sets forth the requirement of procedural
due process, including the right to representation, in identical language as the
Refugee Convention.69 CAT and the Migrant Workers Rights Convention
impose similar conditions on the expulsion of certain category of aliens.70 The

66 See Refugee Convention, supra note 55, art. 33(1) (“No Contracting State shall expel or return
(‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political
opinion.”).
67 Id. art. 33(1)–(2).
68 Id.
69 See Stateless Persons Convention, supra note 56, art. 31.
70 See CAT, supra note 57, art. 3 (“1. No State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected
to torture. 2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall
take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned
of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.”); see also Migrant Workers
Rights Convention, supra note 58, art. 22(2) (“Migrant workers and members of their families may be expelled
from the territory of a State Party only in pursuance of a decision taken by the competent authority in
accordance with law.”).
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bearers of the fundamental obligation not to return essentially retain the
discretion to prescribe their own procedures. However, the substantive
obligations they assume naturally require them to accord appropriate
procedural guarantees, which is the only way that they can carry out their
obligations. The minimum standards are set forth in the ICCPR, which is of
general applicability.71 Such standards are also reiterated in the Refugee
Convention and the Stateless Persons Convention in almost identical terms.72
Again, the key guarantees are the right to be heard, appellate review, and the
right to representation throughout the proceedings.73
The relevant American and European regional instruments also have the
same effect. The ACHR’s basic principle of non-refoulement states that: “An
alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to this Convention may be
expelled from it only pursuant to a decision reached in accordance with law.”74
Although short on details, “pursuant to law” assumes certain fundamental due
process considerations.
The ECHR does not on its own terms contain the principle of nonrefoulement, nor does it make express provisions on expulsion. However, the
European Court of Human Rights interpreted the prohibition against torture
and inhumane treatment contained in Article 3 of the Convention as enshrining
the principle of non-refoulement.75 Moreover, the Court has also ruled that the
application of the principle of non-refoulement requires procedural due
process.76 A good example is the Court’s rejection of Turkey’s imposition of a
five-day limit on persons who entered the country illegally to submit their
asylum claim or forgo their rights.77 Rejecting such a requirement as
unreasonable, the Court noted: “The automatic and mechanical application of
such a short time-limit for submitting an asylum application must be
considered at variance with the protection of fundamental value embodied in
Article 3 of the Convention.”78

71
72

See ICCPR, supra note 2.
See Refugee Convention, supra note 55, art. 32(2); Stateless Persons Convention, supra note 56, art.

32(2).
73
74
75
76
77
78

See ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 13.
ACHR, supra note 59, art. 22(6).
See E.U. IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW, supra note 7, at 15–17.
See Jabari v. Turkey, 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 151, 162.
See id.
Id. at 8.
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Although expulsion or deportation (or removal, as it is often called in some
domestic jurisdictions) is not strictly considered punishment,79 the above
described body of international law and the practice of states80 suggest that
procedural guarantees commensurate with the severity of the measure remain
at all times relevant. Indeed, the ILC has begun the process of drafting basic
common procedures on the expulsion of aliens. The Sixth Report on the
Expulsion of Aliens was recently submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Maurice
Kamto, to the Commission in August of 2010.81 Although this is still a work in
progress, certain basic principles have started to emerge.82 Particularly relevant
are the draft procedural rules. They are described in brief as follows.
Draft article B1 states that “[a]n alien [lawfully]83 in the territory of a State
may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached according
to law.”84 This seemingly simple provision contains some very fundamental
guarantees that Special Rapporteur’s report outlined based on exiting
international law and practice of states. What does “conformity with the law”

79 Although the characterization of deportation as a civil sanction has always prevailed in judicial
decisions, it has never gained overwhelming support in the jurisprudence. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,
468 U.S. 1032 (1984); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709, 730 (1893). As early as 1788,
James Madison said: “If a banishment of this sort be not a punishment, and among the severest of
punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied.” James Madison,
Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN
1787, at 546, 555 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1891). For an analysis of the jurisprudence relating to deportation as
punishment in the context of U.S. law, see Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A Historical
Analysis of the British Practice of Banishment and its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 115 (1999). For a similar analysis, see Won Kidane, Committing a Crime While a Refugee: Rethinking the
Issue of Deportation in Light of the Principle Against Double Jeopardy, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 383 (2007).
80 See ILC Expulsion Memorandum, supra note 14, paras. 186–202, 209–20.
81 Sixth Report on the Expulsion of Aliens, supra note 2.
82 Chairman of the U.N. Drafting Comm., Progress Report on the Topic “Expulsion of Aliens,” Int’l Law
Comm’n (July 23, 2010) (adopting some basic provisions).
83 The Special Rapporteur’s Sixth Report to the Commission provides a detailed discussion of the
distinction that states often make between aliens who are lawfully and unlawfully within their territories.
States sometimes accord lesser procedural guarantees to those who are unlawfully in their territories, although
long-term residents are almost always accorded better rights regardless of their illegal presence. See Sixth
Report on the Expulsion of Aliens, supra note 2, paras. 1–40. While the relevant Draft Article A1 recognizes
the States’ discretion to apply less favorable rules in the process of expulsion of aliens who are not lawfully
present, it nonetheless suggests that they may apply the required higher procedural guarantees to all regardless
of their status. See id. para. 40 (“Scope of [the present] rules of procedure: 1. The draft articles of the present
section shall apply in case of expulsion of an alien legally [lawfully] in the territory of the expelling State. 2.
Nonetheless, a State may also apply these rules to the expulsion of an alien who entered its territory illegally,
in particular if the said alien has a special legal status in the country or if the alien has been residing in the
country for some time.”).
84 Id. para. 64.
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mean? At the most basic level, “‘a logical rule holds that if a State has the right
to regulate the conditions for immigration into its territory it must nevertheless
do so without . . . infringing any rule of international law, [and] in conformity
with the rules which it has adopted or to it which it has agreed [on the
matter] . . . .’”85 In other words, international human rights treaties provide the
basic benchmark. More specifically, the Rapporteur relied on Article 8 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states: “Everyone has the right
to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating
the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.”86 This is one
of the most basic and the most fundamental human rights. The key phrase is, of
course, “effective remedy.” The ICCPR gives this provision some shape and
content. It states: “An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the
present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision
reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of
national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against
his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the
purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially
designated by the competent authority.”87
Having surveyed relevant multinational and regional instruments as well as
the practices of states, the Special Rapporteur identified some fundamental
guarantees that give these provisions concrete shape and character. They are:
“[T]he right to a judge; the right to a trial in the presence of all parties; the
right to assistance by counsel; and the right to an appeal with suspense
effect . . . .”88 In other words, aliens have the right to fair hearing and a
reasoned decision.
Draft article C1 neatly summarizes the appropriate procedural rights:
1.

An alien facing expulsion enjoys the following procedural rights:
a.
The right to receive notice of the expulsion decision.
b. The right to challenge the expulsion [the expulsion
decision].
c.
The right to a hearing.

85 Special Rapporteur on the Expulsion of Aliens, Preliminary Rep. on the Expulsion of Aliens, para. 23,
A/CN.4/554 (June 2, 2005) (footnote omitted).
86 See UDHR, supra note 16, art 8.
87 See ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 13.
88 Sixth Report on the Expulsion of Aliens, supra note 2, para. 67 (recognizing that “these safeguards
were being considered within the framework of newly developing European citizenship, but they could serve
to inspire rules of more universal application”).
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d.

2.

The right of access to effective remedies to challenge
the expulsion decision without discrimination.
e.
The right to consular protection.
f.
The right to counsel.
g. The right to legal aid.
h. The right to interpretation and translation into a
language he or she understands.
The rights listed in paragraph 1 above are without prejudice to
89
other procedural guarantees provided by law.

These may rightfully be considered the most contemporary international
standards. The following Part measures the procedural rules of the European
Union and United States against these standards and against each other, and
identifies the best practices as well as the shortcomings.
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN THE EXPULSION OF ALIENS IN A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES
Weighing in on the enduring debate of the limitations on the state’s right to
expel aliens and expected level of procedural due process, Ian Brownlie
introduced the notion of diligentia quam in suis into the equation.90 The
English equivalent of diligentia quam in suis is “national treatment but on the
basis of the standard ordinarily observed by the particular state in its own
affairs.”91 The concept allows for some relativity within the confines of some
basic standards. According to Brownlie, “Diligentia quam in suis would allow
for the variations in wealth and educational standards between the various
states of the world and yet would not be a mechanical national standard, tied to
equality.”92 He also recognized that “there are certain overriding rules of law
including the proscription of genocide which are clearly international
standards.”93
Although Brownlie’s suggestion is discomforting in some ways, it is
perhaps a recognition of the sad reality that expectations are often linked to the
stage of economic development. Embedded in the notion of diligentia quam in
suis are certain reasonable expectations that hold similarly situated countries to
89

Id. para. 126.
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 504 n.35 (6th ed. 2003); ILC Expulsion
Memorandum, supra note 14, at 172 n.502).
91 See BROWNLIE, supra note 90, at 504; see also ILC Expulsion Memorandum, supra note 14, at 172
n.502.
92 BROWNLIE, supra note 90, at 504.
93 Id.
90
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similar standards. Predicated on this notion, this section provides a
comparative analysis of the nature of procedural due process relating to the
expulsion of aliens in the European Union and United States. It also identifies
the shortcomings of each and identifies the best practices.
A. E.U. Expulsion Standards
The 2010 edition of a reputable treatise on the European Union is
welcoming to the newcomer of the study of E.U. law. The Lisbon Treaty of
2009 has altered preexisting E.U. law—mainly regarding institutions—in some
fundamental ways.94 The history of E.U. law and institutions is long and
complicated.95 This Article does not attempt to provide a detailed description
of the evolution of the laws and the institutions, which has been done very well
elsewhere.96 First, it is important to situate the applicable E.U. migration rules
in the structural hierarchy of E.U. law generally.
The Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) is the
principal source of law on the free movement of persons within, to, and from
the Union.97 It makes rules for various categories of persons,98 but the focus
94 See MATHIJSEN, supra note 6, at ix–xi. At a more technical level, the numbering of the provisions of
the pre-existing treaties were altered, which makes the study that much more laborious.
95 Consider some of the familiar terms that have become associated with the process of European
unification efforts and the European Union’s operations over the years: “European Community,” “European
Communities,” “European Economic Community,” “Common Market,” “Internal Market,” “Treaty on
European Union,” “Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,” “Maastricht Treaty,” the “Amsterdam
Treaty,” the “Treaty of Nice,” the “European Council,” the “European Commission,” “The European
Parliament,” and finally the “Treaty of Lisbon.” Mathijisen’s treatise uses these terms to show the complexity.
See MATHIJSEN, supra note 6, at 3–4. Under existing law, i.e., the TEU as modified by the Treaty of Lisbon,
six primary and several other institutions make up the institutional framework of the European Union. See,
e.g., TEU, supra note 6; TFEU, supra note 6. Among the primary institutions is the European Council, which
is an assembly of heads of state and government and sets the general directions and priorities of the Union, but
it has no legislative power. See TFEU arts. 235–36. A second institution is the European Parliament, which is
an elected representative of the citizens of the Union. It has legislative power within the competence of the
Union. See id. arts. 223–34. A third institution is the Council of the European Union, which is a council of
national ministers and shares legislative authority with the E.U. Parliament. See id. arts. 237–43. A fourth
institution is the European Commission, which is the executive arm of the Union and enforces E.U. laws along
with the Court of Justice. See id. arts. 244–50. Fifth, there is the Court of Justice, which is the principal judicial
organ of the European Union. It interprets E.U. laws and settles disputes. See id. arts. 251–81. Lastly, there is
the Court of Auditors, which audits E.U. finances. See id. arts. 285–87. Mathijsen also adds the European
Central Bank to the list of principal E.U. institutions. See MATHIJSEN, supra note 6, at 59. The relevant TFEU
provisions on the European Bank are Articles 282 through 284.
96 See, e.g., MATHIJSEN, supra note 6, at 1–213.
97 See id. at 238–39.
98 This includes students, workers, and other temporary and permanent residents. See TFEU, supra note
6, arts. 45–55 (discussing the free movement of persons, services, and capital).

KIDANE GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

7/16/2013 10:28 AM

EXPULSION OF ALIENS

305

here is mainly on citizens of the European Union99 and third-country
nationals.100
According to the European Union’s official statement, the European Union
“is not a federation like the United States. Nor is it simply an organisation for
cooperation between governments, like the United Nations. . . . Pooling
sovereignty means, in practice, that the member states delegate some of their
decision-making powers to shared institutions they have created, so that
decisions on specific matters of joint interest can be made democratically at
European level.”101 To carry out these functions, the European Union has
empowered its institutions to legislate in various common areas.102 At the more
practical level, the European Parliament shares legislative power with the
Council of the European Union, as if they were two chambers of a legislative
body.103 The Commission also has its own share of legislative power.104 The
European Union officially calls this joint legislative process “co-decision” or
“the ordinary legislative procedure.”105 Through this joint process, the
European Union enacts various sets of rules. The rules, called “legal acts,”106
have various nomenclatures, which speak to their hierarchy, procedures of
their adoption, and their implementation. The listed ones are: regulations,
directives, decisions, recommendations, and opinions.107 The principal source
of regulatory authority in the area of immigration and residence is Article 79 of
the TFEU.108
Regulations are of general applicability and “shall be binding in [their]
entirety and directly applicable in all Member States” without the need for
implementing legislation.109 Directives are also binding, but they would require
a national incorporation through domestic legislative or administrative
99

See id. arts. 20–25 (discussing non-discrimination and citizens of the Union).
Id. arts. 77–80 (discussing the policies of Border Checks, Asylum, and Immigration).
101 EUROPEAN COMM’N, HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION WORKS 3 (2006).
102 See id. at 4.
103 See id. (referring to the relationship between the Commission, Parliament, and Council as an
“institutional triangle”).
104 See, e.g., TFEU art. 294 (governing the “ordinary legislative procedure for the adoption of an act” for
the Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council); EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 101, at
4 (discussing the “institutional triangle” where “it is the commission that proposes new laws, but it is the
Parliament and Council that enact them”); see also MATHIJSEN, supra note 6, at 65–74.
105 See EU Institutions and Other Bodies, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies (last
visited Jan. 30, 2013).
106 See TFEU pt. 6, tit. I, ch. 2 (entitled “Legal Acts of the Union”).
107 See id. art. 288.
108 Id. art. 79.
109 See id. art. 288.
100
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action.110 While decisions are binding on the parties to whom they are
specifically addressed, recommendations and opinions do not have the force of
law.111 For purposes of this Article, the most important sets of rules are: (1)
Directive 2004/38/EC,112 and (2) Directive 2008/115/EC.113 These standards
were preceded by non-binding guidelines known as Twenty Guidelines of the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on Forced Return of 2005.114
These twenty guiding principles are applicable in all forty-seven Member
States of the Council of Europe,115 which includes all twenty-seven members
of the European Union.116 However, in this Article’s discussion of binding
directives, reference will occasionally be made to these guidelines as
supplemental and subsidiary sources.
Before a detailed discussion of the directives on return or expulsion, it is
important to have a brief look at the fundamentals of E.U. citizenship and
third-country nationals in order to place the directives in context.
1. E.U. Citizens
One of the principal accomplishments of the European Union is the
creation of European Union citizenship.117 TFEU states that “[e]very person
holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.
Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national

110 Id.; see also MATHIJSEN, supra note 6, at 32–33 (“It is clear from the settled case law that, whenever
the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subject matter is concerned, to be unconditional and
sufficiently precise they may be relied upon before the national courts by individuals against the Member State
where it has failed to implement the directive correctly.”).
111 See TFEU art. 288.
112 Council Directive 2004/38, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 1 (EC) [hereinafter E.U. Directive on the Return of E.U.
Citizens].
This title does not seem to reflect the actual content of the Directive, which is primarily concerned with the
rights of families of E.U. citizens working in other countries.
113 E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, at 98.
114 See Comm. of Ministers, Ad hoc Committee of Experts on the Leal Aspects of Territorial Asylum,
Refugees and Stateless Persons, COUNCIL EUR. (May 20, 2005), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM
(2005)40&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=addfinal [hereinafter Twenty Guidelines]. These were adopted on May
4, 2005, at the 925th Meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
and made final on May 20, 2005. Id. See generally E.U. IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW, supra note 7, at 1–9
(for a discussion of the legal basis of immigration and asylum rules).
115 Twenty Guidelines, supra note 114 (“The Guidelines apply to procedures leading to the expulsion of
non-nationals from the territory of members states of the Council of Europe.”).
116 The constitutive treaties, the institutional structure, and the hierarchy of laws of the E.U. are briefly
discussed in the following Parts. See infra Part II.A.2–B.1.
117 See TFEU art. 20(1) (“Citizenship of the Union is hereby established.”).
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citizenship.”118 Citizens of the Union enjoy rights and privileges of citizenship
without discrimination on the basis of their nationality.119 These include the
right to free movement and residence in any Member State,120 the right to elect
and be elected to the European Parliament,121 diplomatic protection by any
member State in a third country,122 and protection of rights by E.U.
institutions.123 Significantly, “[e]very citizen of the Union residing in a
Member State of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and to
stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the Member State in which he
resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State.”124 All of these
rights are, however, subject to certain restrictions. For example, Article 72 of
TFEU allows Member States to impose certain restrictions on access and even
expel E.U. citizens for security, public health, and other public policy
reasons.125 As indicated above, the principal instrument that sets the minimum
standards for the right of residence of E.U. citizens in a Member State is
Directive 2004/38.126 Its standards will be discussed in comparison with the
directive on the expulsion of third-country nationals in Part II.A.3. Before that,
a brief note on third-country nationals is warranted.

118

Id.
Id. art. 18.
120 Id. art. 20(2)(a). Note, however, that residence for a period of more than three months requires a
showing of sufficient resources to support oneself and one’s family, including health insurance. See
MATHIJISEN, supra note 6, at 239–40 (citing Case C-499/06, Nerkowska v. Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych
Oddział w Koszalinie, 2008 E.C.R. I-3993 (2008)).
121 TFEU art. 20(2)(b).
122 Id. art. 20(2)(c).
123 Id. art. 20(2)(d); see also id. art. 21.
124 Id. art. 22(1).
125 See id. art. 72; see also E.U. IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW, supra note 7, at 5 (“Art. 72 . . . is based
upon the recognition that law and order and internal security cannot be fully determined by uniform European
standards leaving no scope of discretion to the EU member States.”).
126 E.U. Directive on the Return of E.U. Citizens, supra note 112, art. 7. Concepts such as national
security and public interest are always subjects of great controversy and generate significant case law. See,
e.g., MATHIJSEN, supra note 6, at 253 (citing an older case, Case 36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975
E.C.R. 1219). In fact, this is one of the most fundamental limitations that give member States a wide range of
legislative and regulatory leeway. For example, the central provision on this, Article 72 of TFEU, reads, “This
Title [Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice] shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent
upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal
security.” TFEU art. 72. See E.U. IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW, supra note 7, at 3–6 (briefly discussing on
the formulation of the public order exception).
119
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2. Third-Country Nationals
The TFEU provisions that apply to E.U. Citizens are under Title II, Part
Two: “Non-discrimination and Citizenship of the Union.”127 However, the
provisions that apply to the third-country nationals are under Title V: “Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice.”128 These provisions set the general principles
in many areas, including the need to ensure free movement within the Union,
and the establishment of common asylum and immigration policy as well as
common standards of removal of third-country nationals.129 Predicated on this
mandate, many regulations and directives were passed.130 As indicated above,
the focus here is on the return directives,131 which will be analyzed in detail
below.
3. E.U. Directives on Common Procedural Standards of Expulsion
The two sets of relevant procedural rules are (1) E.U. Directive on the
Return of E.U. Citizens, and (2) E.U. Directive on Common Standards of
Return. They are discussed in turn below.
a. Standards for the Expulsion of E.U. Citizens
More than anything else, what the E.U. Directive on the Return of Citizens
makes clear is that E.U. citizenship is not full-fledged citizenship. This is due
mainly to the restrictions on residence and the possibility of expulsion from
any member state except the state of the person’s nationality. The restrictions
127

See TFEU arts. 18–25.
See id. arts. 67–80.
129 See id. arts. 77–80.
130 See generally E.U. IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW, supra note 7, at 1–7 (compiling and commenting
on most of the important Regulations and Directives). Harmonization in the area of asylum appears to be more
advanced than that other areas. Important directives in this area include: Council Directive 2005/85, 2005 O.J.
(L 326) 13; E.U. Directive on Minimum Standards for Qualification, supra note 7; Council Directive 2003/9,
2003 O.J. (L 31) 18; Council Directive 2001/55, 2001 O.J. (L 212) 12 (EC); Council Regulation 343/2003,
2003 O.J. (L 50) 1;. Those directives pertaining to entry of third-country nations and their residence include:
Council Directive 2009/52, 2009 O.J. (L 168) 24; Council Directive 2009/50, 2009 O.J. (L 155) 17; Council
Directive 2005/71, 2005 O.J. (L 289) 15; Council Directive 2004/114, 2004 O.J. (L 375) 12; Council Directive
2004/81, 2004 O.J. (L 261) 19; Council Directive 2003/109, 2003 O.J. (L 16) 44; Council Directive 2003/86,
2003 O.J. (L 251) 12; Council Regulation 539/2001, supra note 7; Commission Regulation 562/2006, supra
note 7 (Schengen Border Code).
131 See, e.g., E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 1 (“This Directive sets out
common standards and procedures to be applied in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country
nationals . . . .”); see also E.U. Directive on the Return of E.U. Citizens, supra note 112, art. 1 (“This Directive
lays down: (a) the conditions governing the exercise of the right of free movement and residence within the
territory of the Member States by Union citizens and their family members . . . .”).
128

KIDANE GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

7/16/2013 10:28 AM

EXPULSION OF ALIENS

309

on residence are not insignificant. Residence without conditions and
formalities in an E.U. member state other than the residents own country is
limited to a period of three months.132 Residence for longer periods requires
justification in the form of work or education.133 These limitations are intended
to avoid burdening the social assistance systems of member states.134 Thus,
financial security, including health insurance, is a prerequisite for long-term
residency.135 In legal terms, member states have retained the discretion to
impose restrictions for reasons of public health, public order, and security.136
These are broad discretions that manifest themselves not only in the context of
denial of admission or restriction on residence,137 but also in forcible expulsion
of certain categories of E.U. citizens.138 Moreover, member states have also
retained very broad discretion to “adopt the necessary measures to refuse,
terminate, or withdraw any right conferred by this Directive in the case of
abuse of rights or fraud, such as marriage of convenience.”139
These broad discretions are constrained by the principle of proportionality,
a fundamental jurisprudential underpinning that runs across almost every part
of E.U. immigration law and policy.140
Expressions of the principle are contained in Articles 27 and 35 of the
Directive. Article 27 states: “Measures taken on grounds of public policy or
public security shall comply with the principle of proportionality and shall be
based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individualconcerned.”141
Defining the scope of proportionality in strict language, the same provision
states:
Previous criminal convictions shall not in themselves constitute
grounds for taking such measures. The personal conduct of the
132

E.U. Directive on the Return of E.U. Citizens, supra note 112, art. 6.
Id. art. 7.
134 Id.
135 See id.
136 See id. art. 27 (“Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, Member States may restrict the freedom of
movement and residence of the Union citizens and their family members, irrespective of nationality, on
grounds of public policy, public security or public health.”).
137 See id. art. 27(1).
138 See id. art. 28.
139 Id. art. 35.
140 Id. arts. 27(2), 35. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice also seems to suggest that the
notion of proportionality serves as a check against unlimited exercise of these kinds of broad exceptions. See
E.U. IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW, supra note 7, at 4 (citing Case T-157/79, Regina v. Pieck, 1980 E.C.R.
2171).
141 E.U. Directive on Return of E.U. Citizens, supra note 112, art. 27(2).
133
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individual concerned must represent a genuine, present and
sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests
of society. Justifications that are isolated from the particulars of the
case or that rely on considerations of general prevention shall not be
142
accepted.

Hence, in the admission and exclusion context, the principle of proportionality
limits public policy and public order based restrictions to genuine and present
danger “affecting one of the fundamental interests of the society.”143 In other
words, Member States’ laws and policies are subjected to some kind of strict
scrutiny.
Member states also retain the right to expel Union citizens on “serious
grounds of public policy or public security.”144 These broad discretions are
also subject to the principle of proportionality contained in Article 27.145
Article 28 provides more guidance on the applicability of the principle of
proportionality in the context of expulsion.146
Three levels of proportionality inquiry are envisioned under this provision.
The first level of inquiry pertains to measures taken “on serious grounds of
public policy,”147 which may presumably apply to all categories of E.U.
citizens. In that case, all the considerations of age, health, family and social
and economic integration are examined.148 The second level of inquiry pertains
to Union citizens who are permanent residents. They may not be expelled
“except on serious grounds of public policy or public security.”149 The third
level of scrutiny pertains to Union citizens who have resided in the host state
more than ten years and those who are minors regardless of the length of
residency.150 In these two cases, expulsion decision may not be passed unless
“imperative grounds of public security” so demand.151
While the substantive measures themselves are subject to these levels of
proportionality scrutiny, each Union citizen facing expulsion has
individualized due process. The nature of due process that the Directive
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

Id.
Id.
Id. art. 28(2).
Compare id., with id. art. 27.
Id. art. 28.
Id. art. 28(2).
Id. art. 28(1).
Id. art. 28(2).
See id. art. 28(3).
See id. art 28(3).
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mandates is contained in Article 31. Procedural due process is the central focus
of this Article.152
This provision defines the basic parameters of the due process that
individuals subject to expulsion must have, but it is short on detail. It skips the
primary decision-making process and focuses on review. It does not restrict the
review process to judicial determination; it allows administrative review. There
is no indication that judicial review of the administrative decisions is
required.153 It does not require the appeals themselves to have a suspensive
effect unless the appeals are accompanied by some intermediate motion to
suspend the expulsion while the appeal is pending.154 When such a motion is
made, however, the actual removal must be suspended until the authorities rule
on the motion, with some exceptions (i.e., a previous judicial access and
imperative security reasons).155
Most notably, the review procedure must allow the examination of both
facts and law,156 although the standard of review is not spelled out. Moreover,
the review must also ensure that the measure is not disproportionate.157 This
notion of proportionality is central and seems to have been designed to rectify
errors of fact and law and also to measure the justice of the outcome with more
objective criteria.
Finally, the procedures must guarantee the right to be heard in person
unless that is likely to cause “serious troubles” to security or public policy.158
Again, that might in itself be subject to the proportionality inquiry.
The directive provides no detail on the actual proceeding, both at the
primary and review stages. Due process requirements such as the right to
counsel, legal aid, and translation, are omitted.159 Presumably, these directive
standards are interpreted in light of the various human rights and due process
commitments of the member states. All members of the European Union are
also members of the Council of Europe. As indicated above, the Council of
Europe’s Twenty Guidelines on Forced Return160 provide additional guidance
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160

Id. art. 31.
See id. art. 31(1).
See id. art. 31(2).
See id.
Id. art. 31(3).
Id.
Id. art. 31(4).
See generally id.
See generally Twenty Guidelines, supra note 114.
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and presumably serve as subsidiary sources. Because the guidelines are also
applicable in the expulsion of third-country nationals, those standards are
discussed after the discussion of the rules that apply to third-country nationals
in the next section.
b. Standards for the Expulsion of Third-Country Nationals
The Directive on Common Standards of Return161 is more recent than all
the other standards discussed above. It is also more elaborate, covering almost
every aspect of procedural due process. The preamble outlines the fundamental
principles that the directive enshrines.162
Member states do retain the power to return illegally staying third-country
nationals.163 Member states must have a fair and efficient procedure for the
adjudication of asylum claims and the avoidance of the violation of the
principle of non-refoulement.164 Where return becomes necessary, they should
offer voluntary departure, including providing return assistance.165 They
should provide legal aid where the third-country nationals are unable to pay for
their representation,166 and they should respect the principle of
proportionality,167 taking account of the rights of the child and of the family as
enshrined in the pertinent legal instruments.168 With these basic guiding
principles, the directive outlines some specific rules that member states should
follow. The most important features are discussed below.

161

See E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7.
See id.
163 Id. pmbl., para. 8.
164 Id.
165 Id. pmbl., para. 10 (“Member States should provide for enhanced return assistance and counseling and
make best use of the relevant funding possibilities offered under the European Return Fund.”). For the details
of the E.U.’s Return Fund, see Decision 575/2007, 2007 O.J. (L 144) 45.
166 See E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, pmbl., para. 11 (“A common
minimum set of legal safeguards on decisions related to return should be established to guarantee effective
protection of the interests of the individuals concerned. The necessary legal aid should be made available to
those who lack sufficient resources. Member States should provide in their national legislation for which cases
legal aid is to be considered necessary.”).
167 See id. pmbl., para. 16.
168 See id. pmbl., para. 22 (“In line with the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
the ‘best interests of the child’ should be a primary consideration of Member States when implementing this
Directive. In line with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, respect for family life should be a primary consideration of Member States when implementing this
Directive.”).
162
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The scope of application of the directive is limited to third-country
nationals who are illegally present in a member state.169 Although the member
states do have the discretion to apply the minimum standards that the directive
sets forth to all categories of third-country nationals, they may subject at least
three categories of third-country nationals to less favorable treatment. These
categories are: those refused entry or intercepted by the authorities while trying
to cross by land, sea, or air and failed to gain regularization of their status;170
those who are subject to removal because of criminal convictions;171 and those
who are subject to extradition procedures presumably pursuant to applicable
extradition treaties.172
While the scope of its application vis-à-vis whom may be covered appears
clear, the directive contains a serious technical confusion with respect to the
issue of illegal presence. The directive first states that “Member States shall
issue a return decision to any third-country national staying illegally on their
territory . . . .”173 Apparently, the minimum standards that the directive sets
forth do not necessarily apply to the decision-making process that determines
the legality of the presence because the scope of application is limited to
“third-country nationals staying illegally.”174 However, the directive also states
that the “Directive shall not prevent Member States from adopting a decision
on the ending of a legal stay together with a return decision and/or a decision
on a removal and/or entry ban in a single administrative or judicial decision” as
long as the procedural safeguards are met.175 A related provision reads:
“Member States may at any moment decide to grant an autonomous residence
permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay for compassionate,

169

Id. art. 2(1).
Id. art. 2(2)(a). U.S. law makes a similar distinction between exclusion of arriving aliens and
deportation of those who are already in the territory. The procedural due process accorded to the first category
is inferior to the procedural due process accorded to those in the second category. Specific rules define each
category and the transition from the first stage to the second. For a discussion of these notions, see infra Part
II.C.1.f.
171 Id. art. 2(2)(b). The exact language is those who “are subject to return as a criminal law sanction or as
a consequence of a criminal law sanction, according to national law.” Id. This suggests that some states impose
removal, return or deportation—whatever it is called, as a criminal sanction. The second prong is more
common. Domestic systems often deport non-citizens who are convicted of crimes. An argument is sometimes
made that that is double jeopardy. See, e.g., Kidane, supra note 79, at 432–45 (making this argument in the
context of the deportation of refugees for criminal conviction).
172 E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 2(2)(b).
173 Id. art. 6(1).
174 See id. art. 2(1).
175 Id. art. 6(6).
170
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humanitarian or other reasons to a third-country national staying illegally in
their territory. In that event, no return decision shall be issued.”176
These provisions confuse four different possible procedures, which in turn
confuse the scope of application of the directive’s standards. Ordinarily, there
should first be a proceeding to determine whether the particular individual’s
presence is illegal. That requires the application of the relevant domestic laws
to the particular facts of that individual. A simple threshold inquiry is whether
the individual in question is indeed a third-country national. If a Member State
wants to do that in a separate procedure, it is unclear whether the directive
applies to that portion of the procedure unless, of course, the state chooses to
do so. The second possible procedure involves the termination of lawful
residency for a variety of reasons. That also requires the application of the
relevant laws to particular acts. A good example is a criminal conviction or
national security grounds of termination of lawful residency. Here again, it is
unclear whether the directive applies to this procedure. The third possible
procedure determines whether the illegally present person must be forcibly
removed.177 The last possible procedure seeks to determine if the person who is
determined to be staying illegally and ordered removed, is eligible for some
kind of affirmative relief. One possibility is the application of the principle of
non-refoulement (i.e., if he/she will face persecution).178
The cumulative reading of the above provisions suggests that the drafters
might have confused the various stages of this process. It is unclear to which
one of these four processes that the provisions of the directive mandatorily
apply. Unfortunately, it appears that the directives apply to the least clear and
the least important procedure, which is the third procedure mentioned above—
i.e., as the title to the directive itself suggests, to “illegally staying thirdcountry nationals.”179 That means it does not mandatorily apply to the process
of determination of the illegality of the residence, the termination of illegal

176

Id. art. 6(4).
This third procedure may be confused with the second and fourth procedure discussed below, but read
in light of article 6(6) quoted above, the definition of “removal” as contained in the directive suggests that
there might be a separate procedure to determine whether the illegally staying person must be forcibly
removed. See id. art. 3(5) (“‘[R]emoval’ means the enforcement of the obligation to return, namely the
physical transportation out of the Member State.”); see also id. art. 3(4) (“‘[R]eturn decision’ means an
administrative or judicial decision or act, stating or declaring the stay of a third-country national to be illegal
and imposing or stating an obligation to return.”).
178 See id. art. 5.
179 See id.
177
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residence, or the awarding of affirmative relief.180 This technical glitch
continues to pervade the rest of the provisions. Still, the minimum standards
that it sets are clear. They are discussed below.
The directive sets forth some very basic principles that all member states
must follow. First, it states the underlying operating principles as: “When
implementing this Directive, Member States shall take due account of: (a) the
best interests of the child; (b) family life; (c) the state of health of the thirdcountry national concerned, and respect the principle of non-refoulement.”181
Although it is not clear during which one of the above-mentioned four
possible procedures that the member state must consider these factors, it is
evident that they must consider them sometime before they actually remove the
third-country national.182 These are very important principles. The fact that
considerations of family, health, and best interests of the child183 are given the
same level of importance in the same provision as the principle of nonrefoulement184 is remarkable.
Second, it emphasizes the preference185 for voluntary departure and sets a
limit of seven to thirty days unless considerations of security and public policy
dictate otherwise.186 Given the emphasis on the preference for voluntary
departure, the shortness of the required time is notable. The directive links
voluntary departure to a ban on entry. In fact, it mandates the entry of return
decision to be accompanied by an entry ban: “(a) if no period of voluntary
departure has been granted, or (b) if the obligation to return has not been
complied with.”187 This is an interesting provision because it requires member
states denying voluntary departure to also impose an entry ban, presumably
because the reasons for denying voluntary departure are mainly security and
public order reasons.188 It limits the re-entry ban to five years unless security
and public policy reasons require otherwise. It also rewards the compliant

180 Through many rounds of use and refinement, the INA now avoids this kind of confusion by merging
the various procedures while at the same time multi-furcating the subsets. These procedures are discussed in
Part II.B.
181 E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 5.
182 See id. art. 1.
183 Id. art. 5.
184 Id.
185 See id. para. 10.
186 Id. art. 7(1), (4).
187 Id. art. 11.
188 See id. arts. 7(4), 11(1).
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third-country national by requiring the member state to “consider withdrawing
or suspending the entry ban.”189
Third, it makes several provisions relating to procedural due process. It
requires the return decisions, including decisions on entry ban to be
communicated to the third-country national in writing, which must state the
law and facts and advise the individual of available remedies.190 Although the
directive requires the member states to provide the written decision in a
language that the individual would understand, it allows member states to
ignore this requirement if the third-country national has entered the member
state illegally.191 Indeed, it allows the use of standard forms in such
circumstances.192
While the vagrancies that the above provision makes possible are clear, the
directive requires a very serious review procedure.193
Some of the basic due process rules are far-reaching; as such, most notable:
(1) it emphasizes the importance of the decision maker’s impartiality as well as
independence,194 which are very important considerations because of the
frequent use of executive-administrative agencies as decision makers; (2) it
also emphasizes the reviewer’s power to suspend the actual removal while it
reviews the legality of the order;195 and (3) it requires the provision of
representation, including at government expense.196 If implemented properly,
these standards could provide meaningful due process. Regrettably, however,
for reasons that could not be explained by reasons of cost or efficiency, the
directive reserves this kind of due process to the appellate stage only. As
practitioners could attest, rectifying a case marred by irregularities at the trial
level by appeal is a serious challenge, not to mention costly and inefficient.
Viewed in this context, the directive’s choice appears almost strange. In any
case, the standard at the appellate level being notably fair, it is difficult to
189 See id. art. 11(3). This presumably benefits those who want to come back with some lawful status
without having to wait until the entry ban expires, which could be as long as five years.
190 Id. art. 12(1).
191 Id. art. 12(2), (3).
192 Id. art. 12(3).
193 Id. art. 13. The referenced directive is Council Directive 2005/85, 2005 O.J. (L 326) 13 (EC).
Although this directive is limited to refugee status determination and withdrawal, as the above-quoted
provision shows, the E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return incorporates the provisions relating to
assistance of counsel by reference. E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 13(4).
194 E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 13(1).
195 Id. art. 13(2).
196 Id. art. 13(3), (4).
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reconcile it with the absence of the same at the primary level, which does not
even recognize the right to be informed of the decision in a language the
person subject to the proceeding understands—albeit limited to those who
entered illegally.
Finally, other procedural safeguards that the directive mandates include
juridical review of administrative decisions to detain and continued judicial
supervision of prolonged detention,197 as well as ensuring humane conditions
of detention, especially for families and children, who may only be detained
for the shortest period possible.198
Because the application of all of these procedural rules affects some
fundamental human rights, presumably they must be interpreted in light of
various human rights commitments. The Council of Europe’s Twenty
Guidelines on Forced Return199 may be used as expressions of the human
rights standards applicable in Europe. Some of these standards, which would at
least serve as interpretive tools, are highlighted below.
The guidelines are predicated on the assumption that persons subject to
expulsion should have access to “a fair procedure in line with international
law, which includes access to an effective remedy before a decision on the
removal order is issued or executed.”200 They emphasize the preference for
voluntary return over forced removal and envision some programs of voluntary
return that could probably assist the returnees.201 The guidelines not only
incorporate the principles of non-refoulement in its clearest expression but also
prohibit the removal of individuals who may not qualify for non-refoulement if
the authorities determine that the return decision violates the principle of
proportionality, which aims to balance the government’s legitimate interest in
removing with the returnee’s connectedness with the community, including
“family and personal life.”202 This particular guideline aims at providing better
due process to long-term residents. As indicated above, the notion of
proportionality is the centerpiece of European jurisprudence. The jurisprudence

197

See E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 15.
See id. arts. 16–17.
199 See Twenty Guidelines, supra note 114.
200 See id. pmbl.
201 See id. Guideline 1.
202 See id. Guideline 2 (“The removal order shall only be issued after the authorities of the host state,
having considered all relevant information readily available to them, are satisfied that the possible interference
with the returnee’s right to respect for family and/or private life is, in particular, proportionate and in
pursuance of a legitimate aim.”).
198
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also highlights the need to respect the right to family unity. Although its
implementation might vary, it is clear that it involves some kind of balancing
of interests, which takes into account the length of the residence and family
relations. This approach finds its jurisprudence basis in the several decisions of
the European Court of Human Rights.203
Two more sets of guidelines are worth highlighting; they relate to remedy
against removal and detention. The remedy guideline is perhaps the most
central due process provision.204 This is a more or less satisfactory expression
of due process, although—similar to the directives discussed above—it seems
to limit it to the appellate process. The most notable features are the
requirement of impartiality and independence of the decision makers and the
right to have access to free legal counsel. Again, these requirements are
predicated on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.205
The guidelines on detention are relatively elaborate.206 The most important
features are discussed as follows. First, detention has to be a measure of last
resort.207 Second, the person subjected to detention must be informed of its
basis and allowed to contact a lawyer and health care professional when
needed.208 Third, detention may only be justified as long as removal
proceedings are in progress. “If such arrangements are not executed with due
diligence the detention will cease to be permissible.”209 These requirements are
also based on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.210 A
look at some of the cases suggests two types of restrictions: unreasonably long
detention while removal proceedings are ongoing and any kind of detention
after the removal order if there is no reasonable prospect of actual removal for
any reason.211 Finally, detention must always be subject to judicial supervision
and remedy, which shall be made accessible through the provision of legal
203

See, e.g., id.Commentary on Guideline 2 (citing Boultif v. Switzerland, 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R 121,
121; C. v. Belgium, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R, 915, 922–23; Nasri v. France, 320 Eur. Ct. H.R. 11, 22–23 (1995);
Beldjoudi v. France, 234 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, 28 (1992); Moustaquim v. Belgium, 193 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 18–20
(1991)).
204 Id. Guideline 5.
205 See id. Commentary on Guideline 5 (citing Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999)).
206 See id.Guidelines 6–20.
207 See id. Guideline 6(1).
208 Id. Guideline 6(2).
209 See id. Guideline 7.
210 See id. Commentary on Guidelines 6–7.
211 See id. Commentary on Guideline 7. The Commentary on Guideline 7 relies on cases from the
European Court of Human Rights. See, e.g., Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, 1862–63;
Caprino v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6871/75, 12 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 14, 18–19 (1978).

KIDANE GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

7/16/2013 10:28 AM

EXPULSION OF ALIENS

319

aid.212 The emphasis on the availability of judicial remedy and the accessibility
of the remedy are the notable features of these guidelines.
B. U.S. Expulsion Standards
The relevant body of law that governs the expulsion of aliens from the
United States is the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).213 The INA
makes separate provisions for expulsion of aliens who are considered
inadmissible to the United States and those who need to be expelled after
having been admitted or otherwise considered admitted.214 Before the
discussion of the relevant provisions is provided, it is important to add a note
on the use of terminology and the structure of the relevant body of law.
Although the use of the terms has changed over the years, the INA
technically still makes a distinction between exclusion and deportation.
Exclusion refers to the decision to refuse entry or admission.215 The term entry
and admission are terms of art that are not synonymous. Under the INA, “The
terms ‘admission’ or ‘admitted’ mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry
of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer.”216 Although deportation is not defined under the INA, it
refers to the removal of a person from the interior.217 A 1996 amendment to the
INA consolidated the two procedures into one single removal proceeding.218
Despite the consolidation of the two proceedings, important substantive and
procedural differences still remain. For example, the grounds of exclusion and
the grounds of deportation still remain distinct, with the grounds of deportation
being relatively more forgiving.219

212

See Twenty Guidelines, supra note 113, Guidelines 8–9.
INA § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006); see also id. § 240(a)(3) (“[A] proceeding under this section shall
be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be . . . removed from the United
States.”). The regulations issued pursuant to the INA are codified under Title 8 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. 8 C.F.R §§ 101–1337 (2010).
214 Compare INA, tit. II, ch. 4, with INA, tit. II, ch. 5.
215 See id. § 212(a).
216 Id. § 101(a)(13)(A) (as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2006)); see also Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963) (holding
“innocent, casual and brief excursion” is insufficient to sever the ties and subject the alien to rules of entry).
217 Various provisions of the INA still use the term “deportation.” See, e.g., INA § 237.
218 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1252a(b)(4)
(2006).
219 Compare INA § 212 (discussing the grounds of inadmissibility), with INA § 237 (discussing the
grounds of deportability).
213
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Because of the introduction of the concept of “admission” by the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, persons who
have physically been in the country for a long time may be considered persons
who are seeking admission and be subject to grounds of inadmissibility rather
than grounds of deportability.220 As such, the physical presence of the
individual does not necessarily determine the applicable substantive
provisions.221 As far as procedures are concerned, however, the physical
location and length of presence of the individual make significant difference.222
The following section discusses the various procedures that apply to different
categories of aliens and puts the U.S. procedural due process in perspective.
1. Procedural Due Process in Context
Theoretically, every alien is eligible for some type of due process.223 The
extent of the procedural guarantees depends on various factors including the
location of the individual, the length of stay and the applicable grounds of
exclusion or deportation. There are at least four distinct procedures. This
Subpart measures the nature of procedural due process under each one of these
procedures.
a. Expedited Removal of Inadmissible Arriving Aliens
The term arriving alien is a deeply misleading technical term that refers not
only to persons who have just arrived from abroad, but also to long-term
residents who left the country for a period of more than six months or who left
the United States after committing a crime that would make them inadmissible
regardless of the length of their foreign stay.224 Arriving aliens are considered
applicants for admission.225 Applicants for admission are required to be
inspected by an immigration officer whether they arrive by air, sea, or land.226

220 For a discussion of the use of terminology and the changes that were made in 1996, see STEPHEN H.
LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 514–16 (5th ed. 2009).
221 For example, a person who has resided in the United States for twenty years without being inspected
and admitted would still be subject to grounds of inadmissibility under INA § 212 rather than grounds of
deportability under INA § 237.
222 See infra Part II.C.1.
223 See G-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 764, 780 (BIA 1993) (citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952))
(finding that administrative proceedings are subject to notions of fundamental fairness).
224 See INA § 101(a)(13)(C)(ii), (v).
225 See id. § 235(a)(1).
226 Id. § 235(a)(3).
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Note that if an alien gains entry without inspection, he is still considered an
applicant for admission when he encounters the authorities.227
If the inspecting officer determines that the alien who is seeking admission
does not have the proper documentation, the officer “shall order the alien
removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless the
alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of
persecution.”228 The extent of due process that an arriving alien would get is
limited to the particular officer’s own determination unless, of course, asylum
is sought, in which case elaborate procedures may apply if the person can
prove credible fear.229 Significantly, Congress has authorized the Attorney
General to apply this swift procedure to aliens who have been in the country
for up to two years as long as they entered without inspection.230
b. Expedited Removal of Criminal Aliens
Aliens convicted of certain types of crimes are required to be detained and
put through expedited removal proceedings in immigration courts that are
often located in the detention facility.231 The Attorney General has also
authorized an alternative procedure for criminal aliens who are not permanent
residents.232 The procedures must, however, meet certain due process
requirements including reasonable notice, opportunity to defend, a privilege to
be represented at no cost to the government, the maintenance of the record for
judicial review, and a prohibition of adjudication by the same person who
issued the charges.233 In practice, this alternative procedure is rarely used
because the regular proceeding under INA § 240, which will be discussed

227

See id. § 235(a)(1).
See id. § 235(b)(1)(A)(i).
229 See id. § 235(b)(1)(A)(ii). This one-officer due process has consistently been held to be sufficient due
process for arriving or excludable aliens. It has its genesis in Nishimura v. United States. 142 U.S. 651, 660–61
(1892) (“It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that foreigners who have never been naturalized,
nor acquired any domicile or residence within the United States, nor even been admitted into the country
pursuant to law, shall be permitted to enter, in opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of the
legislative and executive branches of the national government. As to such persons, the decisions of executive
or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by congress, are due process of law.”).
230 See INA § 235(b)(1)(iii)(II). However, despite this authority, the Attorney General chose to apply this
procedure only to those apprehended within fourteen days of their arrival within one hundred miles of the
border. See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877, 48,880 (Aug. 11, 2004).
231 See INA § 238(a)(3).
232 See id. § 238(b).
233 See id. § 238(b)(4).
228
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below, more or less accomplishes the objective that INA § 238 seeks to
accomplish.
c. Procedures Applicable to the Removal of Alien Terrorists
Alien terrorists are subject to special proceedings. Under INA
§ 236A(a)(3), the Attorney General may certify an alien as a terrorist if he has
reasonable grounds to believe that the alien meets the definition of a terrorist
under the INA.234 The Attorney General is required to either charge the
certified terrorist with a criminal offense or put him in removal proceedings.235
The certified alien may seek judicial review of the detention by habeas corpus
under limited circumstances.236 This certification procedure has never been
used.
Another possible procedure in the book that has never been utilized is the
“Alien Terrorist Removal Procedure,”237 which purports to establish the Alien
Terrorist Removal Court (“ATRC”).238 It was supposed to provide a special
forum for the adjudication of terrorism-related removal cases, especially when
confidential evidence is used.239 Suspected terrorists brought before the ATRC
have more due process rights than those put in the regular removal
proceedings, which will be discussed next. Some of the important guarantees
are the right to government-appointed counsel.240 As will be highlighted in the
next Subpart, no such right exists in the regular removal procedures. Other
rights include adequate notice,241 an expeditious and public hearing,242 and a
reasonable opportunity to introduce evidence,243 including the use of
234 See id. § 212(a)(3)(B)(i), (iii). The definition of a terrorist under the INA is complex and it is outside
the scope of this Article.
235 See id. § 236A(a)(5).
236 See id. § 236A(b).
237 See id. § 501–07.
238 See id. § 502. The ATRC was a result of the 1996 expansion of terrorism grounds of exclusion under
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 354(a)(5),
110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) as well as the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
239 See INA § 503.
240 See id. § 504(c)(1) (“The alien shall have a right to be present at such hearing and to be represented by
counsel. Any alien financially unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel assigned to represent
the alien.”); see also id. § 502(e).
241 See id. § 504(b).
242 See id. § 504(a)(1)(2). Although the hearing is public, confidential evidence may be heard in camera.
See id. § 504(d)(5), (e)(3)(A). Although the alien is denied access to classified information (except a
summary), a specially appointed attorney can review the evidence. See id. § 504(e)(3)(F).
243 See id. § 504(c)(2).
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subpoenas for the appearance of witnesses and records at government
expense.244 The alien who loses at the ATRC level may appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia.245 A petition for review would
automatically stay the removal order.246 As will be discussed in the next
Subpart, such is not the case in the regular procedures.
d. Regular Removal Procedures
The regular removal procedures are set forth under INA § 240. As the
comparative analysis under Subpart C below focuses on the regular removal
proceedings, these procedures are discussed here in some detail.
Removal proceedings are set in motion when the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement247 of the Department of Homeland Security248 files charges under
INA § 239 alleging that the respondent must be removed either because he is
inadmissible or because he is deportable.249 The charged individual is brought
before an immigration judge who will conduct the hearing.250 The immigration
judge is a designee of the nation’s chief law enforcement officer, the Attorney
General, and serves at his pleasure.251
Under the INA § 240, “An immigration judge shall conduct proceedings
for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien.”252 In particular,
“[t]he immigration judge shall administer oaths, receive evidence, and
interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses.”253 The
judge may also issue subpoenas and sanction practitioners by civil money
penalty for contempt of court.254 And finally, “the immigration judge shall
decide whether an alien is removable from the United States.”255
244 See id. § 504(d)(2) (“If the application for a subpoena by the alien also makes a showing that the alien
is financially unable to pay for the attendance of a witness so requested, the court may order the cost incurred
by the process and the fees of the witness so subpoenaed to be paid from funds appropriated for the
enforcement of title II.”).
245 See id. § 505(c)(1).
246 See id.
247 U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
248 HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
249 See INA § 239. Grounds of inadmissibility, which apply to persons seeking admission, are set forth
under INA § 212(a) and grounds of deportability are set forth under INA § 237(a).
250 See id. § 240(a)(1).
251 About the Office, U.S. DEP’T JUST. http://www.justice.gov/eoir/orginfo.htm (last updated Sept. 2010).
252 INA § 240(a)(1).
253 Id. § 240(b)(1).
254 Id.
255 See id. § 240(c)(1)(A).
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The nature of the due process that the alien gets is summarized in § 240 of
the INA.256 Most notably, although the alien may be represented by counsel of
his choosing, he does not have the right to legal aid or government-appointed
counsel.257 The exercise of the rights that are included in this paragraph such as
the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses naturally depends on the
availability of counsel who could effectively assist the alien. If counsel is not
available, the right is meaningless, especially because the proceedings are
adversarial258 and the respondent bears the burden of proof at various stages.
For example, if the alien is charged as inadmissible, the alien bears the burden
of showing that he is “clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted and is
not inadmissible,”259 or “by clear and convincing evidence that [she] is
lawfully present in the United States pursuant to a prior admission.”260 Only
then will the burden shift to the government to show that, although the alien
has been lawfully admitted, she is deportable because she falls under one of the
many grounds of deportation. The government has the burden of proving
deportability by the same standard, i.e., clear and convincing evidence.261 If the
government manages to carry the burden, the immigration judge enters an
order finding the alien removable.262 At that point, the alien is given the
opportunity to plead one of several available forms of affirmative relief, which
may include asylum and withholding of removal,263 adjustment of status,264
cancellation of removal,265 and relief under the CAT.266 The alien may also
seek voluntary departure to avoid a reentry bar as a result of the deportation
order.267 The respondent bears the burden of proving that he meets the

256

Id. § 240(b)(4).
The INA requires the judge to give the alien at least ten days to find his own representation. See id.
§ 239(b)(1). If the ten-day period lapses, the judge may continue to hear the case without representation. See
id. § 239(b)(2). As a matter of fact, according to the American Bar Association, eighty-four percent of detained
aliens defend their cases without representation. See REPORT BY THE ABA COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION,
REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSAL TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND
PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 39 (2010).
258 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1641–45
(2010).
259 See INA § 240(c)(2)(A).
260 See id. § 240(c)(2)(B).
261 See id. § 240(c)(3).
262 See id. § 240(c)(1)(A).
263 See id. §§ 208, 241(b)(3).
264 See id. § 245.
265 See id. § 240A(a)–(b).
266 CAT, supra note 57, art. 3.
267 See INA § 240B.
257
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statutory requirements and that he deserves the favorable exercise of discretion
because these forms of relief are discretionary.268
The procedural due process that the alien gets in the adjudication of the
application for relief is exactly the same as the due process that she gets in the
first part of the proceeding, i.e., the proceeding adjudicating the inadmissibility
or deportability.269
C. Comparative Analysis of the E.U. and U.S. Standards in Light of the
International Standards
As indicated in Part I.B above, the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur’s
draft on the standards of the expulsion of aliens provides a good summary of
the consolidating international standards. The most important provision states:
1.

2.

An alien facing expulsion enjoys the following procedural rights:
a. The right to receive notice of the expulsion decision.
b. The right to challenge the expulsion [the expulsion
decision].
c. The right to a hearing.
d. The right of access to effective remedies to challenge the
expulsion decision without discrimination.
e. The right to consular protection.
f. The right to counsel.
g. The right to legal aid.
h. The right to interpretation and translation into a language
he or she understands.
The rights listed in paragraph 1 above are without prejudice to
270
other procedural guarantees provided by law.

268 Id. § 240(c)(4)(B) (“The applicant must comply with the applicable requirements to submit
information or documentation in support of the applicant’s application for relief or protection as provided by
law or by regulation or in the instructions for the application form. In evaluating the testimony of the applicant
or other witness in support of the application, the immigration judge will determine whether or not the
testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant has
satisfied the applicant’s burden of proof.”); see also id. §§ 208, 240A, 245(a). The only form of relief that is
not discretionary is withholding of removal, i.e., the principle of non-refoulement. See INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 (1987); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984). For a discussion of the
affirmative reliefs, see LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 220, at 595–646.
269 See INA § 240(b)(4).
270 Sixth Report on the Expulsion of Aliens, supra note 2, at 47.
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1. The Eight Procedural Guarantees as Benchmarks
The comparative analysis follows these eight categories of rights, as they
could be considered the contemporary international standards.
a. The Right to Receive Notice of the Expulsion Decision
Notice is one of the most fundamental due process rights in any
jurisdiction. Depending on how the removal procedures are structured, the
expulsion decision may come in the form of final removal or deportation order
with no possibility of relief or with a possibility of some type of affirmative
relief.271 The two E.U. directives discussed above as well as the INA contain
provisions relating to notice.272 Notice in itself is of little value if there is no
possibility of challenging the order or seeking an affirmative relief from the
actual expulsion. In that sense, it is a pre-condition for the right to challenge or
seek relief. It is mainly because of what comes next that notice is important.
That is not to understate the importance of notice even when there is no
remedy. For example, in jurisdictions where no administrative decision to
expel is required for the removal of persons illegally present, notice still puts
the alien on notice that his tenure has expired and that he needs to leave to
avoid penalty, which may include a reentry ban.273
In the United States, removal proceedings are commenced by issuing a
document called Notice to Appear under INA Section 239.274 As indicated
above, the document sets forth the charges and allows the respondent to answer
the charges.275 However, there is no statutory requirement that this document
be issued in a language that the respondent understands.276 Similarly, under
E.U. directives, notice must be provided, but a translation is not required for
those who have entered a member state illegally.277 Translation is a serious
271

See E.U. Directive on Return of E.U. Citizens, supra note 112, art. 30.
See INA § 239; E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 12; E.U. Directive
on Return of E.U. Citizens, supra note 112, art. 30.
273 An example of this is Germany, where “aliens who entered Germany illegally within the previous six
months . . . can be expelled without prior injunction and without written notice.” See Sixth Report on the
Expulsion of Aliens, supra note 2, para. 20. That is because “expulsion measures do not require a specific
decision because expulsion is simply a way of executing the obligation of any illegal alien to leave the
territory.” Id. para. 18.
274 See INA § 239.
275 See id.
276 See id.
277 See E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 12(3); E.U. Directive on Return
of E.U. Citizens, supra note 112, art. 30.
272
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problem that relates to the requirement of notice and will be discussed in more
detail below in Subpart h.
Another aspect of notice is the right to be present during the proceedings.
The E.U. directive on the return of E.U. citizens requires the presence of the
alien save in instances of “serious troubles to public policy or security.”278 In
the United States, the INA allows proceedings to take place “(i) in person, (ii)
where agreed by the parties, in the absence of the alien, (iii) through video
conference, or (iv) [subject to some exceptions], through telephone
conference.”279 The notice may be mailed to the alien; however, if he fails to
provide his address to the authorities, no written notice is required to be
issued.280 If the alien fails to appear, he may be ordered removed in absentia.281
The E.U. directives leave these kinds of details to national legislation,282 but
there is no indication in the directives themselves that such procedures would
meet the due process notice requirement they envision.
b. The Right to Challenge the Expulsion Decision
The right to challenge the expulsion decision is expressed in many different
ways at different levels. Regardless of the procedural steps involved, which
will be included with the discussion of access in Part II.C.1.d, the idea is that
the alien must have the opportunity to contest the factual and legal basis of the
expulsion decision before an impartial and independent decision maker. There
are at least two stages—a decision stage and a challenge stage. In the European
Union, citizens have the right to challenge the decision to expel them. In
particular, “[t]he redress procedures shall allow for an examination of the
legality of the decision, as well as the facts and circumstances on which the
proposed measure is based.”283 The safeguard that applies to third-country
nationals appears to be even more elaborate: “The third-country national
concerned shall be afforded an effective remedy to appeal against or seek
review of decisions related to return . . . before a competent judicial or
administrative authority or a competent body composed of members who are
impartial and who enjoy safeguards of independence.”284 The Council of

278
279
280
281
282
283
284

See E.U. Directive on Return of E.U. Citizens, supra note 112, art. 31(4).
See INA § 240(b)(2)(A).
See id. § 240(5)(B).
See id. § 240(5)(A).
See E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 6.
See E.U. Directive on the Return of E.U. Citizens, supra note 112, art. 31(3).
See E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 13(1).
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Europe’s Twenty Guidelines also contains an identical provision suggesting
that this standard applies to all aliens.285
The emphasis here is on the adequacy of the review remedy. Significantly,
where there is no strict requirement for a judicial remedy, the reviewer must be
impartial and independent of the law enforcement officials. In the United
States, the initial decision to expel or remove is subject to administrative
review by an administrative appellate body, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”),286 which can consider both questions of law and fact,287 and a tertiary
review by the appellate courts on questions of law.288 An enduring criticism of
the administrative review process is the lack of decisional independence
because both the initial decisions makers, i.e., immigration judges and the
members of the BIA, serve at the pleasure of the Attorney General, which is
the national’s chief law enforcement official.289 It is doubtful that the existing
structural set up in the United States meets the European Union290 and
international standard of independence.
c. The Right to a Hearing
This international standard does not make a distinction between legal and
illegal or short-term and long-term residents. It envisions a situation whereby
every alien may be given a right to a hearing before she is expelled. Both the
European Union and the United States dispense with the hearing requirement
as far as newly arriving aliens are concerned.291 The E.U. Directive on
285

See Twenty Guidelines, supra note 114, at Guideline 5.
Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last updated
Nov. 2011).
287 See INA § 242 (providing the details of judicial review).
288 See id. § 242(a)(2)(D) (allowing the review of questions of law and constitutional claims in all cases).
289 See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 220, at 744–51; Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization
and the Adjudication of Immigration Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1501, 1502–03 (2010) (expressing uncertainty about
the outcome of a specialized court system); Legomsky, supra note 258, at 1672 (expressing concern about the
Attorney General’s role given that he is a law enforcement officer and the U.S. is often an opposing party in
these cases); Peter J. Levinson, A Specialized Court for Immigration Hearings and Appeals, 56 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 644, 651–54 (1981) (criticizing the Attorney General’s role in the judicial process since he is a law
enforcement official).
290 Although the E.U. member states have significant discretion to use administrative agencies to
adjudicate and review cases, the E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return requirement for impartiality
and independence is clear. See E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 13(1). If the
domestic systems utilize the same kind of arrangement as the United States by placing the reviewing agency
under a law enforcement agency, the domestic systems’ compliance with directive’s requirements of
independence would be doubtful, particularly if the chief has the right hire and fire judges at-will, which is the
case in the United States.
291 See INA §§ 235, 238; E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 2.
286
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Common Standards of Return allows member states to subject three categories
of aliens to an inferior procedure than the directive requires,292 which may
include the denial of a hearing. These categories are: (1) arriving aliens who
are intercepted while trying to cross and are illegally present persons; (2)
criminal convicts; and (3) those subject to extradition procedures.293 Most
notable is the inclusion of all illegal entrants to the exception. Germany for
example, considers those who have illegally resided in the country for up to six
months as arriving aliens and expels them without a meaningful hearing.294
The directives create no obstacle to that as it allows excepting all illegal
residents from the scope of application of the directive.295 E.U. member states
are also allowed to dispense with a hearing or other due process requirements
under the directive with respect to criminal aliens—presumably regardless of
the nature of the crime and the severity of the penalty.296
The INA also subjects arriving aliens and criminal aliens to expedited
procedures.297 In the case of an arriving alien, the only hearing he gets is the
immigration officer’s inspection, which is unreviewable.298 Note that a person
is deemed an arriving alien if found within fifteen days of his arrival and
within one hundred miles of the border.299 Although, theoretically, criminal
aliens are subject to expedited proceedings, the actual hearing they get is more
or less the same as the one given to long-term residents.300
Both the E.U. and U.S. rules that exclude certain categories of aliens from
the requirement of a meaningful hearing fall short of international standards.
However, by comparison, the U.S. rules are more favorable to arriving and
criminal aliens because: (1) the meaning of an arriving alien is limited; and (2)
criminal aliens are subject to expedited proceedings, but the expedited
proceedings are not inherently inferior as they are governed by the same rules.
292

See E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 2(2).
See id.
294 See Sixth Report on the Expulsion of Aliens, supra note 2, paras. 18, 20 (citing Gesetz über den
Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die Integration von Ausländern im Bundesgebiet [Aufenth G] [Residence
Act], July 30, 2004, BGBL. I at 84 [hereinafter Residence Act] (regarding the stay, employment and
integration of aliens in the federal territory)).
295 See E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 2(2)(a).
296 See id. art. 2(2)(b).
297 See INA §§ 235, 238.
298 See id. § 235(b)(1)(A)(i).
299 See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877, 48,879 (Aug. 11, 2004). Note
also that the equivalent rule in Germany is six months. See Sixth Report on the Expulsion of Aliens, supra note
2, at para. 18.
300 See INA § 238.
293
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The only distinction is often the fact that those in expedited proceedings are
detained.301
d. The Right of Access to Effective Remedies To Challenge the Expulsion
Decision Without Discrimination
This rule emphasizes three interrelated due process rights: (1) the right to
an effective remedy; (2) the right to have access to that remedy; (3) and finally,
the right to have such access without discrimination. They are discussed in
turn.
i. The Right to an Effective Remedy
Remedies could come in the form of rectification of a decision that has
already been made or in the form of an affirmative relief. An effective remedy
in the first instance would require observance of the whole range of due
process rights associated with a meaningful review of the factual and legal
basis of the decision to expel. In a way, it incorporates all the due process
rights discussed in the previous Subpart, including notice and impartial and
independent decision-making.
In the European Union, the right to effective remedy is stated clearly: “The
third-country national shall be afforded an effective remedy to appeal against
or seek review of decisions related to return . . . before a competent judicial or
administrative authority or a competent body composed of members who are
impartial and who enjoy safeguards of independence.”302 Compliance with this
rule would certainly ensure an effective remedy. As indicated above, the U.S.
rules fall short of the independence prong.303
The second aspect of an effective remedy is the availability of affirmative
relief. Both the E.U. and U.S. rules provide for the principle of nonrefoulement as a final remedy against the execution of an expulsion order.304 It
is a shared fundamental principle of international law, the substance of which
needs no further commentary here, but the availability of the remedy itself is
not sufficient unless the right procedures are in place, which make the remedy
effective. Non-refoulement as a form of relief is closely linked to asylum. Both

301
302
303
304

See id. §§ 238, 240.
See E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 13.
See id. art. 13(1).
See id. art. 5; see also INA § 241(b)(3).
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the European Union and United States have elaborate asylum criteria distinct
from the expulsion standards that are the subject of discussion here.305
The E.U. Directive on the Return of E.U. Citizens seems to insinuate that
long-term residents may avoid expulsion due to reasons of public order or
public policy,306 but the details are left to member states. In the United States,
apart from asylum and non-refoulement, there is at least one effective form of
relief that is potentially available for long-term residents—it is called
cancellation of removal.307 Where it applies, it provides an effective remedy
against expulsion. Cancellation of removal may be granted to aliens who have
lived in the United States for more than seven years, five of which as lawful
permanent residents, or ten years for those who never had lawful permanent
resident status.308 Each form of relief is encumbered with more eligibility
requirements such as the absence of conviction of certain types of crimes.309
The E.U. Directive on the Return of E.U. Citizens makes a remedy
analogous to cancellation of removal available to E.U. citizens who are minors
or those who have resided in the particular E.U. country for ten years.310 While
some E.U. member states may provide the same kind of remedy to thirdcountry nationals, the Directive on Common Standards of Return does not
make any reference to these kinds of relief, although it envisions that member
states may do so for humanitarian and compassionate reasons.311 Whether the
international standard for an effective remedy includes these types of relief on
humanitarian and compassionate grounds is doubtful. In any case, while the
substantive scope of their application remains subject to the discretion of
states, wherever they are made available, the procedures of claiming them have
to be fair and effective. In the United States, the procedures for claiming these
forms of relief are the same as the procedures that determine the removability
of the alien.312 Although the E.U. directives provide no guidance on this,
305

See, e.g., INA §§ 208, 241(b)(3); E.U. Directive on Minimum Standards for Qualification, supra note

7.
306

See E.U. Directive on the Return of E.U. Citizens, supra note 112, art. 28(1).
See INA § 240A(a), (b). A related form of relief is called Registry; it offers amnesty to those who
entered the United States before January 1, 1972. See id. § 249.
308 See id. § 240A(a), (b).
309 See id.
310 See E.U. Directive on Return of E.U. Citizens, supra note 112, at art. 28 (“An expulsion decision may
not be taken against Union citizens, except if the decision is based on imperative grounds of public security, as
defined by the Member States, if they: (a) have resided in the host Member State for the previous ten years; or
(b) are a minor, except if the expulsion is necessary for the best interest of the child . . . .”).
311 See E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 6(4).
312 See INA § 240(c)(4)(A).
307
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presumably, the procedures that they set forth for the expulsion decision and
non-refoulement would similarly apply to the adjudication of claims for these
forms of relief. In any case, the U.S. standards and procedures are notable for
their technical clarity.
ii. Access to the Remedy
The availability of the remedy itself is, of course, meaningless if it is not
accessible for the supposed beneficiary. Several factors determine access to the
remedy. Most notable are notice, the right to counsel, and the right to legal
aid.313
iii. Access to the Remedy Without Discrimination
Making effective remedies available and accessible to all aliens without
discrimination is a problematic proposition for the European Union because of
the ambiguous nature of E.U. citizenship. E.U. citizens are both aliens and
citizens at the same time, i.e., aliens to all E.U. countries except their own but
citizens of the Union. As aliens, they are subject to the immigration rules of the
country where they find themselves, but as E.U. citizens, they are eligible for
favorable treatment. An example of favorable treatment that comes in the form
of a remedy is the provision that allows the cancellation of expulsion order for
E.U. citizen minors and long-term residents.314 The same kind of remedy is not
mandated by the E.U. Directive on Return of Third-Country Nationals.315 The
procedural due process that is attached to this form of remedy also appears
superior because it requires the examination of the proportionality of the
expulsion decision with other factors, including long-term age and
residence.316 However, that being a function of the better status of Union
citizens, such kind of favorable treatment appears inherent. Whether it violates
the access-to-remedy-without-discrimination provision is doubtful precisely
because these two groups are not similarly situated.
Traditionally, the United States has made a variety of situation-based
remedies available to particular groups of aliens and restricted access to those

313 This Article discusses notice in Part II.C.1. Because of the overlap and for the sake of completeness
and clarity, the discussion of the right to counsel and legal aid is deferred to Part II.C.1.f. and Part II.C.1.g.
314 See E.U. Directive on the Return of E.U. Citizens, supra note 112, art. 28(3).
315 See E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 6(1).
316 See E.U. Directive on the Return of E.U. Citizens, supra note 112, art. 31(3).
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remedies on the basis of nationality or country of origin.317 These measures
have mostly been taken to benefit certain categories of beneficiaries instead of
discriminating against others; however, allegations of discrimination have
never been uncommon. One particular such allegation relates to the favorable
treatment of Cuban asylum-seekers over Haitian asylum-seekers.318 To the
extent that some of the disparately treated categories of aliens are similarly
situated, there is a real possibility that the international principles of providing
access to remedies without discrimination might be violated. Apart from these
types of situation-dependent specific remedies, the procedures that the INA
sets forth are not de jure discriminatory—although access always depends on
the ability to pay, which will be discussed in some detail below.
e. The Right to Consular Protection
Consular and diplomatic protection of citizens is a basic sovereign function
recognized under international law;319 however, its limits are uncertain. Two
issues in particular are subjects of controversy. One relates to the issue of
whether it is an individual right or human right of the citizen who is located in
another sovereign state.320 The second relates to the permissible scope of such
interference in light of the competing principle of nonintervention under
international law.321 Despite these controversies surrounding the issue of
consular protection, the draft international standard allows aliens to get
consular protection against expulsion.

317 E.g., Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1255 (2006)).
318 This issue is a subject of enduring scholarly inquiry; for good analysis of this and related issues of
discrimination, see Malissia Lennox, Refugees, Racism, and Repatriations: A Critique of the United States’
Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 687 (1993); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., America’s Schizophrenic
Immigration Policy: Race, Class, and Reason, 41 B.C. L. REV. 755 (2000).
319 The most notable source of international law in this area is the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
320 The notable International Court of Justice cases on this issue are LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J.
466 (June 27), and Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). For a good
commentary on the LaGrand case’s distinction between individual rights and human rights, see Joan
Fitzpatrick, The Unreality of International Law in the United States and the LaGrand Case, 27 YALE J. INT’L
L. 427, 427–30 (2002).
321 See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence over
Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 6–8 (1989) (reciting the origin and development of the principle of nonintervention including related provisions in the UN Charter); see also Ernesto Hernández-López, Sovereignty
Migrates in U.S. and Mexican Law: Transnational Influences in Plenary Power and Non-Intervention, 40
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1345, 1359–62 (2007) (discussing the principle in the context of U.S.–Mexico
relations vis-à-vis immigration issues).
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Under the TFEU, E.U. citizens are eligible to receive consular and
diplomatic protection by all E.U. member states as they are citizens of the
Union.322 Neither of the directives on return make note of the right to consular
protection.323 Similarly, in the United States, no specific rules enumerate such
right. Given the controversy surrounding consular notification even in
detention and death penalty cases, and the chronic non-observance of the
principle in that context,324 the fate of this principle in the European Union and
the United States remains to be seen.
f. The Right to Counsel
Right to counsel is a key component of due process in any legal
proceeding. Expulsion proceedings are often regulated by a complex set of
rules that aliens are unable to navigate pro se. The recognition of the right to
counsel in international law is firm; both the European Union and United
States have rules to the same effect.
Although the E.U. Directive on the Return of E.U. Citizens does not
provide the details of due process including the right to counsel, the Directive
on Common Standards of Return clearly states: “The third-country national
concerned shall have the possibility to obtain legal advice, representation and,
where necessary, linguistic advice.”325 The equivalent U.S. rule reads: “[T]he
alien shall have the privilege of being represented, at no cost to the
Government.”326
The E.U. directive refers to the opportunity to obtain legal advice and
representation as a right, but the U.S. rule presents it as a privilege327 to avoid
confusion about the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the United States
Constitution.328 Neither of these constructions is particularly precise about the
nature and scope of the right or privilege granted. The resulting uncertainty
322

See TFEU art. 20.
See E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7; E.U. Directive on the Return of
E.U. Citizens, supra note 112.
324 See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 320 (discussing non-implementation of the right of consular
protection in the United States, even after the LaGrand decision).
325 See E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 13(3).
326 INA, § 240(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006); see also id. § 292.
327 Compare E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 13(4) (“Member states
shall ensure that the necessary legal assistance and/or representation is granted . . . .”) (emphasis added), with
INA § 292 (“[T]he person concerned shall have the privilege of being represented . . . .”) (emphasis added).
328 See Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 716 (A.G. 2009) (finding no Sixth Amendment right to
representation at deportation hearings because they are civil procedures, not criminal ones).
323
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leads to controversy, particularly when determining what constitutes effective
assistance of counsel. Effective assistance of counsel is most important at two
stages. The first key stage is before expulsion proceedings, at legal proceedings
that may impact the expulsion proceeding (such as a criminal proceeding).
Issues relating to this stage are of significant importance in the United States
because the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to counsel relating to criminal
proceedings.329 A recent Supreme Court decision that extended the criminal
defendant’s right to be informed of the immigration consequences of a plea
deal has given the issue of right to counsel renewed momentum.330 Second,
having effective counsel is also important at expulsion hearings. Here, the
problem usually arises in the context of undoing decisions resulting in
expulsion where counsel’s deficient representation likely changed the result of
the proceeding.331
g. The Right to Legal Aid
The right to legal aid is directly related to access to effective remedy and
the right to counsel discussed above. The availability of the right or the
privilege is, of course, meaningless if it is not accessible. The rule in the
United States has no ambiguity—there is a privilege of representation by
counsel, but it is “at no cost to the Government.”332 The right to appointed
counsel or legal aid in the European Union is not without ambiguity. Both the
Directive on Common Standards of Return333 and the Twenty Guidelines on
Forced Return of the Council of Europe334 contain provisions purporting to
guarantee legal aid to aliens who cannot afford to hire their own counsel. The
relevant provision of the directive states: “Member States shall ensure that the
necessary legal assistance and/or representation is granted on request free of
charge in accordance with relevant national legislation or rules regarding legal
aid, and may provide that such free legal assistance and/ or representation is

329

See id.
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486–87 (2010) (reversing enduring jurisprudence that held
that lack of advice of immigration consequences of a plea agreement did not violate the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel).
331 See Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 732–35 (setting forth the most recent criteria for determining the
effectiveness of assistance).
332 See INA § 240(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006). The only exception is in the ATRC proceedings, which
is discussed with INA §§ 502–07, supra notes 234–46.
333 See E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 13(4).
334 See Twenty Guidelines, supra note 114, Guidelines 5(2), 9(2).
330
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subject to conditions set out in [a related directive on asylum].”335 This
provision is, of course, replete with permissive language and as such is not a
firm commitment. First, it uses the term “shall ensure” not just “shall”
suggesting at least one more step. Second, it must be granted in accordance
with national legislation, which subjects the rule to national legislation which
may add all sorts of limitations and restrictions. Third, it allows Member States
to adopt the legal aid rules on asylum, the content of which is also uncertain.
The content of the asylum legal aid directive is also restrictive for five reasons.
First, it is only mandated for appellate level not for the initial proceeding
where the record gets developed.336 Second, member states may even deny
legal aid for national-level appeals in their domestic legislation as long as they
provide it during a particular appellate process mandated by the directive.337
Third, they may restrict it to situations where “the appeal is likely to
succeed.”338 Fourth, they may impose monetary or time limit on the grant.339
Finally, they may seek reimbursement from the alien when he is able to pay.340
These restrictions, cumulatively, make the E.U. rules on legal aid a more
verbose restatement of the simple U.S. rule of “at no cost to the Government.”
Hence, it is fair to conclude that the right to legal aid, as a progressive
international standard, has not yet gotten concrete expression and recognition
in either jurisdiction,341 with the United States rejecting it with remarkable
confidence.
h. The Right to Interpretation and Translation
In the United States, the administrative authorities are under no statutory
obligation to issue the charges in a language the alien understands; however,
courts have held that the lack of interpretation in the actual proceedings is a

335 See E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 13(4). The cross-cited Asylum
Directive is Council Directive 2005/85, supra note 130.
336 See Council Directive 2005/85, supra note 130 (stating that free representation is given only “[i]n the
event of a negative decision by a determining authority”).
337 See id. art. 15(3)(a).
338 See id. art. 15(3)(d). However the same provision notes thatlegal aid “must not be arbitrarily
restricted.” Id.
339 See id. art. 15(5)(a).
340 See id. art. 15(6).
341 Even the Twenty Guidelines state,”Where the subject of the removal order does not have sufficient
means to pay for necessary legal assistance, he/she should be given free of charge, in accordance with the
relevant national rules regarding legal aid.” Twenty Guidelines, supra note 114, Guideline 5(2) (using the
language “should” and “in accordance with”).
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denial of due process.342 As a result, respondents in removal proceedings are
now provided with simultaneous interpretation. However, all the documents
are filed in English343 and aliens receive no government-paid assistance outside
of the courtroom.344
While the E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return requires any
relevant documents, particularly decisions, to be communicated in the
language that the alien understands, it allows member states to ignore such
requirement if the alien had entered the country illegally.345 In that case, they
could use standard forms whether the alien understands it or not.346 Because
the alien is eventually entitled to challenge the decisions against him by appeal,
during which she may receive government-paid translation services,347 the lack
of due process at the primary decision making level could presumably be
rectified. However, there is a real risk that the lack of translation at the initial
level would make it impossible for the alien to even think about an appeal.
While the exact implementation of the E.U. standards in the domestic
jurisdictions of the member states might vary, it appears that the lack of
translation in that first instance is a more serious violation of the international
standards relating to notice in the European Union than in the United States
because in the United States, persons who have entered illegally, unless
apprehended in border states within fifteen days of their arrival, are eligible for
a removal hearing under INA § 240, during which they receive translation
services. Again, while some E.U. member states may provide for similar or
even better conditions, the directive allows them to issue documents to aliens
who entered illegally in a language that they do not understand. In the United
States, once an alien gets past the fourteen-day mark, only an immigration

342

See, e.g., He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Due process requires that an applicant be
given competent translation services.”); Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1984) (affirming the
right to adequate translation).
343 Compare Immigration Court Practice Manual Chapter 3: Filing with the Immigration Court at 41 (“All
documents filed with the Immigration Court must be in the English language . . . .”), with Rachael Pine, Note,
Toward a Meaningful Right to Counsel for Refugees in Exclusion Proceedings, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 297, 310 (1983) (“The notice is printed in English and a few other major languages.”).
344 Should I Bring an Interpreter to My Asylum Interview?, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMIGR. SERVICES (Sept.
23, 2008), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=
da55809c4410f010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=3a82ef4c766fd010VgnVCM1000000ec
d190aRCRD (noting that no translator will be provided in non-judicial asylum hearings).
345 E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 12(3).
346 See id.
347 See id. art. 13(3).
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judge may order him removed.348 Courts have held that due process requires
competent translation of the expulsion proceeding, which would also require a
complete translation of the charge.349 In the E.U. member states, that
possibility cannot be ruled out. A good example is Germany’s jurisprudential
approach to illegal entry and illegal presence. Under the Act of 30 July 2004,
persons who are found within six months of illegal entry may be expelled
without the need for any administrative proceeding because expulsion is
viewed as “a way of executing the obligation of any illegal alien to leave the
territory.”350 Under this approach, the alien is under a continued obligation to
leave, which means that he can be expelled without being informed of the
grounds because the directive does not mandate translation of the charges and
the decision to illegal entrants.
2. Variations on the Fundamental Assumptions and Substantive
Prescriptions that Affect the Procedures
Ultimately, the approximation to contemporary international human rights
of the quality of the due process that the E.U. and U.S. rules purport to accord
is more or less the same. However, one aspect of their approaches is
remarkably different, which gives the impression that the E.U. rules are more
favorable to the protection of the due process rights of aliens, i.e., the European
Union’s ostensibly human rights-based approach and the United States’ law
enforcement-based approaches. This proposition may best be explained by
example. First, the E.U. Directive on Return of Third-Country Nationals
begins by stating the general principle as, “When implementing this Directive,
Member States shall take due account of: (a) the best interest of the child; (b)
family life; (c) the state of health of the third-country national concerned.”351
Although some of the same considerations may apply in the United States, they
are embedded in some law enforcement-type provisions.352
Although similar notions of family unity and interest of the child dictate
this provision, it is not exactly an expression of the internationally recognized

348 See INA § 240(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006) (“[U]nless otherwise specified in this Act, a proceeding
under this section shall be the sole procedure for determining whether an alien may be . . . removed from the
United States.”).
349 See, e.g., He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 597 (9th Cir. 2003).
350 Sixth Report on the Expulsion of Aliens, supra note 2, para. 18 (citing Residence Act, supra note 294,
at 84).
351 See E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 5.
352 See, e.g., INA § 240A(b).
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rights of family unity and the best interest of the child.353 Most notably, the
extreme hardship has to be to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident child,
spouse, or parent—not just any child, spouse, or parent, which is more
restrictive than the E.U. standard. Also, the form of relief is granted at the
pleasure of the chief law enforcement officer as it is completely discretionary.
The second example that highlights the difference in approaches is the
prescriptions on voluntary departure. While both encourage voluntary
departure, the European Union attempts to do it by rewarding the departing
alien with monetary compensation to a certain degree,354 and the United States
enforces it by threatening punishment, which makes it a purely punitive
approach. The European Union has set up a voluntary departure fund to assist
voluntarily departing aliens, although the amount of money seems limited.355
In the United States, voluntary departure is granted to aliens who are able to
pay their own way back to their country. The only reward they could expect is
the avoidance of a reentry ban, which a deportation order carries. The relevant
rule states:
The Attorney General may permit an alien voluntarily to depart the
United States at the alien’s own expense under this subsection, in lieu
of being subject to proceedings under section 240 or prior to the
completion of such proceedings, if the alien is not deportable under
356
section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) or section 237(a)(4)(B).

The third example relates to the principle of proportionality. The principle of
proportionality balances competing interests and any legal decision is usually a
balancing of competing interests. The European Union’s use and expression of
this principle throughout the directives adds some degree of clarity to the

353 C.f. Mehemi v. France, 1997-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1959, 1968, 1973 (holding that separation of a parent
from a minor child is a disproportionate violates the applicant’s right to respect for his private and family life);
2 Rep. of the Hum. Rts. Comm., 72d sess., July 9–27, 2001, Annex X at 199, U.N. Doc. A/56/40; GAOR, 56th
sess., Supp. No. 40 (2001) Winata v. Australia, Communication No. 930/2000, Hum. Rts. Comm., UN Doc.
A/56/40, GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Vol. II, 199, 201 (2001) (noting that the deportation of parents of
an Australian child is an “interference” with the family and hence violates the ICCPR).
354 See Return Fund, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/
migration-asylum-borders/return-fund/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (discussing how the European
Union uses the Return Fund to provide special assistance for vulnerable persons).
355 See id. (referring to the E.U. Return Fund). For the details of the Return Fund, see E.U. Decision
575/2007, supra note 165, at 45.
356 See INA § 240(B).
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limitations of the exercise of sovereign power.357 The term proportionality does
not underpin the U.S. immigration rules. Perhaps the equivalent of the notion
of proportionality is the concept of “hardship” or “extreme hardship”
repeatedly used in the INA.358 The hardship inquiry is often very precise as to
who must suffer it and how much.359 Extreme hardship as a concept appears to
be more than a proportionality inquiry, which suggests a fair balance. Again,
although the differences at the most practical level might not be as great as a
comparison of these provisions make it seem, the difference in approaches is
not insignificant and may ultimately impact the quality of the due process.
The final example that highlights the difference in the fundamental
assumptions is the detention standards. Both sets of rules allow detention as a
means of securing the expulsion of aliens. But again, the two sets of rules
make the rights versus law enforcement approach clear.
The E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return dedicates an entire
chapter on detention.360 It allows the detention of aliens only if other less
coercive measures are deemed ineffective and there is “a risk of absconding”
and that the alien would hamper removal if released.361 It also limits detention
to the shortest possible period to effect removal. Moreover, the rules require “a
speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of detention.”362 The rules further
require a periodic judicial review of detention including ex officio.363 In
particular, detention may only last for as long as a reasonable prospect of
removal exists; otherwise, “detention ceases to be justified and the person
concerned shall be released immediately.”364 In any case, each state is required
to limit the maximum period of removal-related detention to six months.365

357

See, e.g., E.U. Directive on Return of E.U. Citizens, supra note 112, art. 27(2) (“Measures taken on
grounds of public policy or public security shall comply with the principle of proportionality and shall be
based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned.”).
358 See, e.g., INA § 240(A)(b).
359 See, e.g., id. (establishing that removal may be cancelled where “removal would result in exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”).
360 See E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 15.
361 See id. art. 15(1).
362 See id. art. 15(2)(a).
363 See id. art. 15(3).
364 See id. art. 15(4).
365 See id. art. 15(5). If the third-country national or his country of nationality fails to cooperate, detention
may be extended for twelve more months under national laws. Id. art. 15(6).
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The directive also sets forth conditions of detention and emphasizes the
rights of the detainees. Some of the protections include separate facilities for
immigration detainees, access to legal representation and visitation by family
and international organizations, and health care.366 Special rules apply to the
detention of minors and families. The animating principle is the best interest of
the child.367 Detention of a minor is a measure of last resort and must only last
for “the shortest possible period of time” during which time they should have
access to education and recreational activities.368 The rules also make clear that
families may only be detained in separate facilities that guarantee their
privacy.369
The Council of Europe’s Twenty Guidelines, which are predicated on the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, also take the same
approach and supplement these detention rules. The Guidelines emphasize the
prohibition on unreasonably long detention while the removal proceedings are
in progress or any detention once a determination is made that there is no
reasonable prospect of removal.370 They also emphasize the need for a periodic
judicial supervision and access to judicial remedy including through the
provision of legal aid.371
Although the nature, length and severity of the detention that aliens receive
in the European Union and the United States may depend on a variety of
interrelated factors and may only be judged case by case, the difference in the
fundamental approaches is made clear by a brief look at the INA rules on
detention. By contrast to the human rights approach that the above-discussed
E.U. rules take, the INA rules take a quintessentially law enforcement
approach. For example, § 236 of the INA, titled “Apprehension and Detention
of Aliens,” states in part: “On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an
alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is
to be removed from the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and
pending such decision, the Attorney General—may continue to detain the
arrested alien; and (2) may release the alien on [bond].”372 A related provision,
titled “Detention of criminal aliens,” reads: “The Attorney General shall take

366
367
368
369
370
371
372

See id. art. 16.
See id. art. 17(5).
Id. art. 17(1), (3)–(4).
See id. art. 17(2).
See Twenty Guidelines, supra note 114, Guideline 7.
Id. Guidelines 8–9.
INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2006).
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into custody any alien who—(A) is inadmissible by reason of having
committed any offense covered in section 212(a)(2).”373 This particular rule
requires the Attorney General to detain with no discretion to release.374 Related
provisions of the INA provide for the circumstances where the Attorney
General may release detained aliens as a matter of discretion,375 while
expressly precluding judicial review of the Attorney General’s decision.376
The length of detention is a subject of immense jurisprudential inquiry.
Two U.S. Supreme Court decisions provide the most current rule in two
different contexts, i.e., possibility of indefinite detention when actual removal
is impracticable, and detention while removal proceedings are in progress. In
the landmark case of Zadvydas v. Davis,377 the Supreme Court held that
indefinite detention of an alien where there is not reasonable prospect of
removal violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.378 The
Court also added that detention must always have reasonable justification,
while at the same time making exceptions for national security and public
safety reasons.379 However, the Court subsequently allowed the categorical
detention of a certain class of aliens while removal proceedings are in progress,
even if they are not personally determined to carry a risk of absconding or pose
a security threat.380 It held in particular that “[d]etention during removal
proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.”381
The above-discussed four examples suggest that although the nature of due
process that the E.U. and U.S. rules provide are more or less comparable, the
fundamental assumptions that underpin the two rules appear different. While
the E.U. rules appear to be driven by human rights principles and owe their
articulation to international human rights instruments and the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights, which emphasizes the rights of the child
and of the family, the U.S. rules owe their articulation to considerations of law
373

Id. § 236(c)(1).
Other mandatory detention provisions include id. § 236(a) (“Mandatory Detention of Suspected
Terrorists”).
375 See id. § 236(c)(2).
376 See id. § 236(e) (“The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of this
section shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General
under this section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or
parole.”).
377 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
378 See id. at 690.
379 Id. at 690–96.
380 See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003).
381 Id.
374
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enforcement. This distinction in emphasis appears to make a difference in how
the relationship between aliens and their host states are perceived, which may
ultimately affect the quality of due process they get.
CONCLUSION
Sovereign states’ right to expel aliens in times of war and peace is not
unlimited. The various sources of international law discussed in Part I provide
the legal limits that apply in the different contexts. The law is still in a state of
development. In times of war, human rights norms do not cease to apply. Apart
from the derogations that are permitted due to compelling exigencies of war,
the legal limits on the expulsion of aliens in times of war are the same as those
that apply in times of peace.382
The most contemporary expression of the limits under international human
rights law is contained in the Sixth Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Expulsion of Aliens. Draft C1 summarizes the appropriate procedural due
process that aliens facing expulsion must be accorded.383 These due process
rights include notice, effective remedy, access to an effective remedy including
through appointed counsel or legal aid, and the right to interpretation at every
important stage.384
The E.U. and U.S. procedural rules attempt to approximate the international
standards but fall short of providing effective remedy in most cases. First, both
sets of rules deny illegal entrants any kind of due process because of their
illegal entry.385 Although persons who could prove that they would face
persecution are often given a chance to submit their claims, the denial of due
process to entire groups of illegal entrants is a cause for concern. The U.S.
rules on expedited removal are more forgiving than the E.U. rules, which allow
the exclusion of all illegal entrants from the benefits of the directives on
return386 because the U.S. rules on expedited removal only cover aliens who

382 Cf. LESLIE C. GREEN, ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR 457 (2d ed. 1999) (“[U]nlike the
international agreements relative to the preservation of human rights in peacetime, the law of armed conflict
lays down penal measures for those who offend gravely against human rights. It appears therefore, that,
paradoxical though it may seem, there is more chance for the effective enforcement of human rights and
punishment for offenses against them in time of armed conflict than there is during peacetime.”).
383 Sixth Report on the Expulsion of Aliens, supra note 2, at 47.
384 Id.
385 Compare supra Part II.A, with supra Part II.B.
386 E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 2(2).
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are apprehended within one hundred miles of the border within fifteen days of
their arrival.387
Second, while both sets of rules require appropriate notice to be given,
neither guarantees all categories of aliens the right to be properly notified at
every stage of the process. The E.U. rules require translation services only at
the appellate level.388 The U.S. requires government paid interpretation only in
the actual court hearings.389 Under both sets of rules, aliens receive neither a
translated version of the initial charging documents, not interpretation services
related to that initial stage. That indeed affects the effectiveness of whatever
subsequent remedy they may have as the record will contain documents and
other types of evidence developed without the alien’s informed input. Damage
done at the initial or trial level is often difficult to rectify at the appellate level.
Third, an important consideration of the effectiveness of the remedy is the
impartiality and independence of the decision maker. The E.U. rules expressly
recognize this, and as such appear to be in line with the international
standards.390 Leaving aside the possibility that the member states may
compromise this rule in their domestic laws in the interest of efficiency and
other considerations, the E.U. rules contain a better expression of this rule than
the U.S. rules, which are unequivocally law enforcement oriented. As
discussed above in some detail, the issue of independence of the decision
makers has been a subject of continued concern. Future reform efforts in the
United States could benefit from the expressions of the international
instruments as well as the E.U. rules.
Fourth, while the right to counsel as an important due process right is
clearly expressed in both sets of rules, the United States unequivocally rejects
any notion that the government should assist in legal representation. Indeed,
there is no mention of the right to legal aid at all.391 The E.U. rules mention
legal aid in many places, but a closer look makes it clear that the recognition of
this right is replete with many exceptions and discretions.392 In any case, the
European Union is clearly ahead on the issue of the right to legal aid. The
387

Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877, 48,877 (Aug. 11, 2004).
See E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 13(3).
389 See He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Due process requires that an applicant be
given competent translation services.”); Augustin v. Sava, 735 F. 2d 32, 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1984) (affirming the
right to adequate translation).
390 See E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, art. 13(1).
391 INA § 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(a) (2006).
392 See E.U. Directive on Common Standards of Return, supra note 7, pmbl., para. 11.
388
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United States will hopefully follow that trend and comply with contemporary
international standards, especially because the U.S. expulsion proceedings are
adversarial393 in which the unrepresented alien would have little chance of
prevailing.
Finally, a closer look at the E.U. and U.S. rules suggests there is one
fundamental lesson that each can learn from the other. The European Union’s
rules are predicated on basic human rights instruments and jurisprudence. It
emphasizes the rights of the child and of the family and relies on the principle
of proportionality. These principles would appear to add humanity to the
expulsion process, which is a very severe measure.394 The U.S. rules are
quintessentially law enforcement rules and could be ameliorated through the
use of some of the basic human rights principles. Such is particularly true in
two contexts: The first one is voluntary departure. In the United States, the
only reward that a voluntarily departing individual could expect is the
avoidance of a penalty in the form of reentry ban.395 In the European Union, at
least theoretically, it is designed to facilitate the alien’s departure and possible
reintegration in the home country. The second is the use of detention. In the
United States, detention is the regular means of enforcing the law and is often
mandatory.396 In the European Union, again, at least theoretically, it is
considered a means of last resort and for a limited purpose.397 Moreover,
regardless of the actual practice, the E.U. rules emphasize the human rights of
the detainees, particularly the rights of children and the family.
On the other hand, by comparison, the U.S. rules have better technical
clarity that the E.U. rules could learn from. Indeed, as indicated above, the
E.U. directives suffer from a very serious technical glitch with respect to the
scope of application. The directives do not sufficiently identify the appropriate
procedural stage during which the rules are supposed to apply.398 The
directives are supposedly designed to govern procedures after an expulsion
order has been issued; however, several of its provisions suggest that
procedures before and after the actual expulsion order may also be governed
393 Matt Adams, Advancing the “Right” to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST.
169, 169–70 (2010).
394 Recall what James Madison said: “[I]f a banishment of this sort be not a punishment, and among the
severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied.” Madison,
supra note 79, at 555.
395 See INA § 212(a)(9)(B).
396 See DORA SCHRIRO, IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2009).
397 See Twenty Guidelines, supra note 114, Guideline 6.
398 See supra note 176–93 and accompanying text.
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by the directives.399 A look at the U.S. procedures could give the E.U. rules
some technical clarity. As discussed in some detail above, INA § 240 removal
proceedings combine the determination of removability with the adjudication
of affirmative relief, which may include non-refoulement. In other words, an
alien who is found removable, which the E.U. directives consider illegally
staying, may seek a form of relief in the same proceeding. The due process
rules would ideally apply to both stages of the removal process.
This Article has identified the appropriate international legal standards that
apply in the expulsion of aliens in times of war and peace and conducted a
comparative study of the E.U. and U.S. rules on expulsion vis-à-vis the
international standards. While both jurisdictions attempt to approximate the
international standards of due process, they have some significant
shortcomings of their own. As they refine and develop their due process
standards, they also have many lessons that they could learn from each other.
This Article has highlighted some of the shortcomings and the lessons that they
could learn from the international standards and from each other for the
betterment of the aliens in their midst and, as such, their own respective
societies.

399

See supra note 176–193 and accompanying text.

